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Owning Our Bodies: An Examination 
of Property Law and Biotechnology 
RICHARD GOLD* 
[ A ]nd to ask gently, but in all sincerity, the ever-recurring query of 
the ages, Is not life more than meat, and the body more than 
raiment?1 
This Article examines whether property law provides an 
appropriate forum for determining who should have rights in human 
biological materials. The current conception of property law is that 
goods subject to it are allocated according to market norms. 
Because of this focus, property law has difficulty dealing with non-
market aspects of these materials. 
E. Richard Gold 1995 all rights reserved. 
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1. W.E. BURGHARDT Du Bors, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS 126 (Penguin Books 
1982) (1903). 
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If all goes according to plan, scientists will have sequenced the entire 
human genome by the year 2005.2 The goal of this sequencing effort 
is to furnish researchers and physicians with sufficient information that, 
using the tools of biotechnology,3 they will be able to combat disease 
and ailment through the synthesis of human hormones and enzymes, the 
development of new drugs and, eventually, the use of gene therapy.4 
To accomplish both the sequencing effort and the ensuing research, 
scientists will have to create innovations surpassing current technologies 
as well as make significant discoveries. As these innovations and 
discoveries accumulate and their importance becomes increasingly 
recognized, individual researchers and their funding agencies are likely 
to attempt to assert control over both the products of their discovery and 
the profits to be derived there:from.5 The extent to which society ought 
to respect such assertions of control and the forms such assertions ought 
to take are the subjects of this Article. 
2. The year 2005 is the goal set for the completion of the Human Genome 
Project, an international effort to map the genome. See CHRISTOPHER WILLS, EXONS, 
INTRONS, AND TALKING GENES 10 (1991). Wills defines genome as "[a]ll the genes of 
an organism, along with all the other DNA of the chromosomes." Id at 345. 
3. Biotechnology has been defined as follows: "Biotechnology, broadly defined, 
includes any technique that uses living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or 
modify products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop micro-organisms for 
specific uses-including recently developed techniques such as gene cloning and cell 
fusion." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BA-337, NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND 
CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT 24 (1987) [hereinafter OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND 
CELLS]. It should be noted that, according to this definition, the effort to sequence the 
human genome is, itself, a biotechnology. 
4. See generally ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE HUMAN BLUEPRINT passim (1991) 
(discussing the Human Genome Project and its implications for medical and other 
research); WILLS, supra note 2, passim ( discussing the Human Genome Project and its 
applications). Gene therapy involves the addition of genetic material to a patient's cells 
in order to alleviate the symptoms of a genetic disease. Id at 344. 
5. Witness, for example, the transatlantic skirmish over whether the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) ought to apply for and be granted patent rights over relatively 
short sequences of human DNA. See Leslie Roberts, Genome Patent Fight Erupts, 254 
SCI. 184 ( 1991 ); Gina Kolata, Biologist's Speedy Gene Method Scares Peers But Gains 
Backer, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at Cl, CIO; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, 
and Product- Development, 257 SCI. 903 (1992); Reid G. Adler, Genome Research: 
Fulfilling the Public s Expectations/or Knowledge and Commercialization,257 SCI. 908 
(1992); Thomas D. Kiley, Patents on Random Complementary DNA Fragments?, 257 
SCI. 915 (1992); Gina Kolata, In Rush to Patent Genes, the Claims Get Smaller, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, § 4, at 12; Leslie Roberts, Rumors Fly Over Rejection of NIH 
Claim, 257 SCI. 1855 (1992); Leslie Roberts, Top HHS LawyerSeekstoBlockNIH, 258 
SCI. 209 (1992); Christopher Anderson, NIH to Appeal Patent Decision, 259 SCI. 302 
(1993); Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 Sci. 909 (1994). 
Disputes have also arisen with respect to public access to DNA databases. See Eliot 
Marshall, HGS Opens Its Databanks-For A Price, 266 Sc1. 25 (1994); Eliot Marshall, 
A Showdown Over Gene Fragments, 266 SCI. 208 (1994). 
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Biotechnological research on human tissue has two distinctive 
characteristics relevant to the discussion that follows. First, many of the 
products of such research are compounds commonly found in the human 
body or are components of the body itself. Such products include, for 
example, insulin and other hormones, healthy and cancerous human 
cells, immunological agents, and DNA 6 sequences that code for human 
proteins. Second, these products are most often used in curing or 
preventing human disease.7 For example, scientific discovery has 
allowed patients suffering from diabetes and similar hormonal diseases 
to self-administer insulin and other hormones; physicians treat cancer 
patients with various immunological agents;8 and, should gene therapy 
become feasible, physicians will introduce DNA sequences into patients' 
cells in order to control genetic disease.9 
These two characteristics-that biotechnology involving the human 
body yields products that a healthy human body naturally produces and 
that such products are used primarily in the provision of health 
care-together distinguish the claims of researchers in the field of 
biotechnology in the human body from the claims of other inventors. 
The human body and its components are substantially dissimilar from 
the raw materials of most other research. Specifically, our culture and 
society imbue human bodies and body components with a richer 
significance than most material objects. In addition, given that the 
products of biotechnology in the human body will be medicines and 
other agents administered to living human beings, the safety of such 
medicines must be ensured. Further, if human health is properly viewed 
as a merit rather than a market good, '0 then it ought to be provided, to 
6. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) contains the genetic material for most life forms. 
7. In fact, human health care is the focus of most research and development in 
the biotechnology industry generally. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. 
CONGRESS, OTA-BA-401, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: U.S. INVESTMENT 
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY-SUMMARY 3 (1988) [hereinafter U.S. INVESTMENT]. Approximate-
ly half of all researchers in the health field use human tissues. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN 
TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 3, at 52. 
· 8. Lawrence K. Altman, Cancer Patients Aided by Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
1992, at A18. 
9. See, e.g., Richard C. Mulligan, The Basic Science of Gene Therapy, 260 Sci. 
926 (1993); Natalie Angier, Panel Permits Use of Genes in Treating Cystic Fibrosis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at A28. See generally WILLS, supra note 2 (discussing the 
Human Genome Project, its origins, related technologies, and future applications). 
10. See ROBERT G. EVANS, STRAINED MERCY: THE ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN 
HEALTH CARE 63 (1984). The term "market good" refers to a good that ought to be 
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some extent, to all members of our community regardless of their ability 
to pay. 11 
This Article explores whether, given these characteristics, property law 
is the most appropriate way to allocate control over human biological 
materials. Part I opens the discussion with a brief description of the way 
property discourse treats goods made subject to it. Specifically, this part 
examines whether property discourse provides a forum to discuss the 
complex and diverse ways in which contemporary American society 
values human biological materials. This examination is followed, in Part 
II, with an exploration of some of the ways we do, in fact, value the 
human body and human health, two goods closely allied to human 
biological materials. In Part III, Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California, 12 the only case in which a senior court seriously addressed 
the issue of the ownership of human biological materials, is discussed. 
The exploration of Moore leads, in Part IV, to a discussion of whether 
certain values, such as dignity and autonomy, can be translated into 
other values, such as market value. Since this Article concludes that 
values are not translatable into others and that property discourse focuses 
on market values, Part V considers whether property discourse is 
sufficiently flexible to permit a direct examination of non-market values. 
I. THE NATURE OF PROPERTY DISCOURSE 
Researchers and those arguing on their behalf commonly express their 
assertions of control over human biological materials in terms of 
property law. 13 Property, whether in the form of common-law proper-
ty, a patent right, or a trade secret, offers researchers a significant degree 
of control over the subsequent use of their discoveries and the ability to 
substantially profit from these discoveries. Property law is, however, 
imbued with certain attributes that make its application to discoveries in 
distributed on the basis of one's ability to pay. This point is raised simply to point out 
that in many countries, including Canada, health care is viewed as a merit good. Id 
11. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 86-91 (1983). The right to health 
care has been recognized internationally, in human rights instruments, see, e.g., 
Organization of American States: Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, 28 
l.L.M. 161, 164 (stating that everyone has a right to health, including primary health 
care), and through the provision of state health care in most western countries, see, e.g., 
MILTON I. ROEMER, NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: THE COUNTRIES 
(1991) (referring to Germany, Belgium, France, Japan, Italy, Greece, Spain, Canada, 
Australia, Norway, Great Britain, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark). 
12. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 936 (1991). 
13. See, e.g., OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 3; sources 
cited, supra note 5. 
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the field of biotechnological research in the human body questionable. 
Those who participate in property discourse, as developed in American 
courtrooms, treat goods considered "property" primarily as market 
goods. To those who engage in this discourse, market goods are 
optimally14 distributed through the auspices of the market which takes 
into account all the values and disvalues pertaining to a good and 
allocates the good in such a manner as to maximize overall value. The 
human body and its component parts are not, however, market goods. 
This is so because many modes of valuing the body cannot be translated 
into or understood in terms of a market price. Similarly, human health 
is a non-market good. 15 Since the aim of biotechnological research in 
the human body is primarily the promotion of human health, biotechno-
logical innovations themselves have a strong non-market component. 
Interpreters of property law, should they treat the human body and 
human health as subject to property law and, thus, as market goods, are 
likely not only to ignore the non-market aspects16 of these goods but 
also to resist addressing these non-market aspects when they are 
specifically raised. They will so resist because they believe that the 
market is the mechanism best-equipped to deal with these aspects in a 
neutral manner. This belief is the source of much difficulty primarily 
because it prematurely arrests discussion in the courtroom about how 
best to promote all of the values inhering in a particular good. Judges 
and lawyers, wishing to appeal to neutral methods of choosing among 
competing claims, rely on the market to balance the plethora of ways of 
valuing a good. Since the market cannot sensibly assign a price to many 
values inhering in the human body and human biological materials, 17 
14. Optimal is used in the economic, or Pareto, sense of the word. 
15. A non-market good is a good that ought to be allocated on some basis other 
than willingness to pay. 
16. A non-market aspect, or non-market value, refers to a way of valuing a good 
in terms other than price. For the present, it is not suggested that such ways of valuing 
goods can never be translated into a market price; it is only meant that one does not 
normally attach a price to such a mode of valuation. For example, an office manager 
readily translates her office's need for pens and paper into a market price but a lover 
does not normally attach a price to the presence of her or his loved one. 
17. The Office of Technology Assessment defines human biological materials as 
follows: 
What are human biological materials? Human bodies contain a number of 
parts that can be useful in biomedical research. Healthy individuals continually 
produce a number of replenishable substances, including blood, skin, bone 
marrow, hair, urine, perspiration, saliva, milk, semen, and tears. Human 
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such values will be ignored in the formulation of judicial opmions 
concerning the body and such materials. Thus, by relying on the 
market, we risk making judicial decisions that fail to adequately balance 
the competing needs of members of our society with respect to these 
goods. 
A. Propertys Inner Heart: Market Values
The academic literature affords little insight as to which interests 
courts seek to promote in allocating property rights. The received 
learning, extracted from this literature, is that the label "property" is best 
understood as the legal conclusion that a good is, in some way, 
valuable. 18 In what respect, however, the good must be valuable, and 
thus be worthy of protection as property, is unclear. A good, after all, 
can be valuable in myriad ways including its aesthetic attributes, its 
ability to provoke intellectual insight, its provision of comfort, its 
inspirational qualities, and its market price. For example, a building 
may be valuable in terms of the beauty of its architecture, the shelter it 
provides to its inhabitants, its quiet serenity that inspires creative 
contemplation, its history, and its price on the open market. The 
received learning fails to define which, if any, of these ways of valuing 
a good, either singly or in combination, motivates courts to label a good 
as property. 
For this reason, in order to discover the basis upon which property 
rights are in fact being awarded and balanced, it is essential to examine 
case law. Such an examination reveals that courts find a good to be 
"valuable," and thus worthy of protection as property, when its dominant 
bodies also contain nonreplenishing parts, such as oocytes or organs, which 
may either be vital (e.g., heart) or to some extent expendable (e.g., lymph 
nodes or a second kidney). Finally, diseased examples of these body parts also 
exist. 
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 3, at 24. The Office of 
Technology Assessment distinguishes undeveloped human biological materials from 
biological inventions developed from such materials. Id In this Article, both 
undeveloped and developed material are included within the definition of human 
biological materials. This is done because certain substances, for example hormones, are 
the developed products of biotechnological research yet identical, except with respect to 
purity, to naturally occurring substances. In some processes, however, the products 
developed through biotechnology are significantly different from their undeveloped 
precursors. Such products are not included within this Article's definition of human 
biological materials. 
18. See, e.g., A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
107, 130 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the 
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. 
REV. 325, 364 (1980); Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and Property, 38 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 117, 120 (1988). 
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value to the parties is economic. 19 Where a party can demonstrate that 
a good is economically valuable to that party-that the party will trade 
in that good on an open market-courts are likely to award property 
rights if to do so will enhance such trade. If, however, the parties 
cannot persuade a court that their interest in the good is principally 
economic or the court perceives that the allocation of property rights to 
one or the other of the parties will, in fact, hinder trade in the good, the 
court is unlikely to award a property right. 20 
Despite the coupling of property law analysis with a good's market 
value, courts appreciate that people value the good in ways other than 
the good's market price.21 Courts assume, however, that the price of 
a good on the market reflects all such modes of valuation. 22 That is, 
courts believe that a good's market price is epiphenomena! of all the 
various ways in which people value that good.23 In the market, people 
attach a monetary price to the way in which they individually value a 
good. This monetary price is a function of many factors including, for 
example, whether possession of the good is essential to the way in which 
the individual values the good and whether the individual values other 
goods more than the good in question. 
Consider, for example, several of the possible ways to value a 
wedding ring. 24 The jeweler who created the ring is proud of her skill 
as exemplified in the design and execution of the ring. The jewelry 
store manager values the ring as a means to derive an income on which 
to live. The wearer of the wedding ring values it, at least in the ideal 
case, as a symbol of mutual love. Each of the jeweler, the manager, and 
the wearer, although valuing the ring in diverse ways, will be willing to 
pay some price for it. The price each individual is willing to pay will 
be a function of how each values the ring. The manager, who views the 
ring as merely a means to achieve an income, will attach a lower price 
to the ring than would the jeweler, who views the ring as unique. The 
jeweler, in tum, will attach a lower price to the ring than the wearer 
since possession of the ring is essential to the way in which the wearer 
19. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. 
21. See, e.g., infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. This example is borrowed from Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982). 
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values the ring-as a constant reminder of mutual love----'---but is not 
essential to the jeweler's mode of valuation-as a source of pride-since 
the jeweler can be proud of the ring from afar.25 Since the wearer will 
be willing to pay the most for the ring on the market, the wearer will 
come to own it. Through this process of individual assessment of 
willingness to pay, the market ensures that the ring is put to its highest 
use.26 
The market, as thus described, offers courts the opportunity to ensure 
that goods are put to their highest use and to do so without having to 
make explicit value choices. The market provides a mechanism through 
which individual assessments of value, as translated into money prices, 
are objectively compared. This comparison is merely mechanical and 
involves no a priori determination of which modes of valuation ought to 
prevail. Given this understanding of the market, the courts confidently 
put aside any explicit evaluation of worth, trusting the market to rank the 
ways in which the good is valued.27 This has two benefits from the 
courts' point of view. First, since courts refrain from making difficult 
policy decisions-the ranking of modes of valuation-they remain well 
within the boundaries of their institutional role: that of impartial 
arbiters. They thus avoid any question of institutional competency. 
Second, the market provides the courts with a relatively straightforward 
method of allocating property rights. Courts do not have to struggle 
with and evaluate a large variety of frequently conflicting modes of 
valuation; they need only examine goods from one standpoint: the 
economic one. 
While a more thorough analysis is undertaken elsewhere, 28 support 
for the preceding analysis is provided by examining three decisions that 
exhibit, in particular, the fundamental role that market values play in 
property discourse. 
B. Chakrabarty: Turning a Blind Eye to Non-Economic Values 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty 29 involved the creation, through genetic 
engineering, of a new bacterium that digests oil spills. Chakrabarty 
created this bacterium by introducing naturally occurring strands of 
25. In fact, the jeweler may take more pride in the ring knowing that the wearer 
sincerely cherishes it than if the ring remained in the jeweler's possession. 
26. From the point of view of market analysis, the highest use for a good is exactly 
that use to which the good would be put in a perfect market. 
27. See infra Part III. . 
28. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF 
HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (forthcoming 1996). 
29. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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genetic material into the cell of an existing bacterium. The added 
genetic material carried genes that enabled the bacterium to break down 
multiple components of crude oil.30 So far as was known, no naturally 
occurring bacterium carried out this function. Accordingly, Chakrabarty 
sought patent protection for his "invention." 
The United States Supreme Court held that Chakrabarty was entitled 
to a patent over his bacterium. The Court stated that Congress intended 
that its patent laws be liberally interpreted so that '"anything under the 
sun that is made by man"' would be patentable.31 Patent rights are 
essential, the Court held, to ensure inventive activity: activity that will 
bolster the economy and lead to increased employment and better 
lives. 32 To be sure, the general rule of patentability is subject to an 
exception for phenomena of nature;33 however, as befits an exception, 
these phenomena were narrowly defined by the Court to include physical 
phenomena such as new minerals and plants, and abstract ideas such as 
the laws of gravity and of relativity.34 The Court concluded that 
Chakrabarty's bacterium was not a phenomenon of nature. No naturally 
occurring bacterium carried out its function-it was the result of human 
ingenuity and research. 35 In other words, the Court concluded that 
goods found in their natural form and abstract ideas cannot be owned, 
but goods that have been transformed from their natural state, or ideas 
that have been put to a practical end, are patentable. This conclusion 
was driven by the Court's desire to further the economic goal of 
encouraging inventive activity by distinguishing between abstract 
inventions or physical phenomena that promote such activity best by 
remaining in the public domain and concrete inventions that best foster 
such activity by being·subject to patent rights. 
30. Id at 305. 
31. Id at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952) and H.R. 
REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)). 
32. Id at 307 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480 (1974)). 
33. Id at 309. The Court noted, "This is not to suggest that§ 101 has no limits 
or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas have been held not patentable." Id 
34. Id The Court stated, "Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new 
plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not 
patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of 
gravity:" Id 
35. Id at 310, 313. 
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Some of those opposed to Chakrabarty's patent claim argued that the 
grant of patent rights in genetically engineered organisms could have 
devastating social, health, and environmental consequences.36 They 
argued that the Court should not agree to Chakrabarty's claim without 
first examining the effects that granting such rights would have on 
human health, the environment, and respect for life.37 They argued that 
such an examination would lead the Court to reject Chakrabarty's claim. 
That is, those opposed to Chakrabarty's claim argued that, to uphold the 
values of human dignity, human health, and environmental concern, the 
claim ought to be rejected. 
The Court met this request to consider non-economic values with a 
two-pronged response. First, it held that the non-economic effects of 
granting a patent right to Chakrabarty would be minimal. 38 While the 
failure to gain patent rights in genetically engineered organisms might 
slow down the pace of research in this field,39 no judicial decision, the 
Court held, would "deter the scientific mind from probing into the 
unknown any more than Canute could command the tides."40 
Second, the Court held that it was not competent to consider any but 
economic factors inhering in genetically engineered organisms.41 Other 
ways of valuing such organisms-for example, in terms of their effect 
on health, the environment, and human dignity-were matters of "high 
policy" that only Congress could address.42 Because Congress had not 
exempted genetically engineered organisms from the scope of patent 
law43 and because Congress had employed broad language to describe 
36. Id. at 316. The Court stated, "We are told that genetic research and related 
technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss 
of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life." 
Id. See generally Sharon Kingman, Safety Concerns Halt U.K. Study, 263 Sci. 748 
( 1994) ( discussing the shutdown of cancer research project due to safety concerns); Eliot 
Marshall, One Less Hoop for Gene Therapy, 265 SCI. 599 (1994) ( discussing the removal 
of the requirement that all gene therapy protocols be subject to public examination). 
37. Id. at 316-17. The Court stated, "It is argued that this Court should weigh 
these potential hazards in considering whether [Chakrabarty's] invention is patentable 
subject matter under §101." Id. 
38. Id. at 317. The Court noted, "The grant or denial of patents on micro-
organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks." Id. 
39. Id. This thought ignores the fact that those opposed to genetic research are in 
favor of slowing down the pace of research. Id. at 316. 
40. Id. at 317. 
41. Id. In the words of the Court: "What is more important is that we are without 
competence to entertain these arguments-either to brush them aside as fantasies 
generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them." Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 318. 
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patentable subject matter,44 the Court stated that it had no choice but 
to accord a patent to Chakrabarty. 
Chakrabarty illustrates, in a context not dissimilar to that discussed in 
this Article-human manipulation of genetic code-that courts willingly 
entertain economic arguments in allocating property rights but refrain 
from entertaining non-market values. 
C. Gilliam: Vindicating Artistic Integrity? 
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,45 "Monty Python," 
the British comedy troupe, sought to enjoin ABC from broadcasting a 
television program consisting of significantly edited and rearranged 
comedy shows written and performed by the troupe. The shows had 
originally aired in England, under the name "Monty Python's Flying 
Circus," pursuant to a scriptwriters' agreement between Monty Python 
and the British Broadcasting Company. Under the agreement, the BBC 
could not alter scripts submitted by Monty Python, except in minor 
ways, unless it first consulted with the comedy troupe. The BBC also 
had the authority to license the broadcast of the shows outside of 
England. Apart from this authority to alter scripts prior to production 
of the actual episodes and to license foreign broadcasts of the show, the 
BBC retained no rights to the scripts. 
Although non-commercial and some small commercial American 
broadcasters had aired several "Monty Python's Flying Circus" shows, 
the first large commercial broadcaster to become interested in these 
shows was ABC. ABC hoped to broadcast excerpts from various 
"Monty Python's Flying Circus" episodes. It therefore approached the 
comedy troupe, seeking rights to such a broadcast, but was rebuffed 
because Monty Python believed the proposed format to be too disjointed. 
Meanwhile, Time-Life Films acquired the rights to the shows from the 
BBC. In its agreement with the BBC, Time-Life was given the right to 
edit the shows in order to insert commercials and to censor objectionable 
material. (The scriptwriters' agreement between Monty Python and the 
BBC had provided no such right.) Time-Life then licensed ABC to 
broadcast the shows. 
44. Id. at 315. 
45. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
1177 
ABC proposed to broadcast a total of six half-hour "Monty Python's 
Flying Circus" shows in two ninety-minute specials. Given that out of 
every ninety minutes of broadcast time, twenty-four minutes are 
normally devoted to commercials, Monty Python members feared that 
the shows would be severely edited. BBC officials promised that the 
shows would be broadcast back-to-back in their entirety. The troupe 
accepted this assurance. When ABC broadcast the first of the two 
specials in early October 1975, members of Monty Python angrily 
discovered that ABC had heavily edited the shows in order to fit in 
commercials and to remove objectionable material. The comedy troupe 
felt that its shows had been mutilated. 
When Monty Python later learned that ABC intended to broadcast a 
second special in December, it approached ABC to negotiate a delay. 
These negotiations failed. Monty Python then commenced an action to 
prevent ABC's broadcast of the second special and any re-broadcast of 
the first special. After instituting its action, Monty Python sought a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin ABC from airing the second special. 
The troupe argued that by altering the sequence of the original shows, 
ABC had misappropriated the underlying scripts. These scripts, Monty 
Python contended, belonged to the troupe. The trial court sympathized 
with Monty Python's predicament, holding that ABC had severely 
distorted the original "Monty Python's Flying Circus" shows. The judge 
held, however, that Monty Python had not established its ownership of 
the underlying scripts. The judge also found that ABC would be 
irreparably harmed if it could not broadcast the second special. He 
therefore refused to grant the requested injunction. Monty Python 
appealed this ruling. By the time the appeal was heard, however, ABC 
had broadcast the second special. Monty Python thus sought a 
preliminary injunction to prevent any future broadcasts of the two 
specials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
granted this relief. 46 
The facts in Gilliam have been set out in some detail in order to 
highlight Monty Python's consistent concern over the presentation of its 
work. In its scriptwriters' agreement with the BBC, in its rejection of 
ABC's initial offer to broadcast segments of "Monty Python's Flying 
Circus" shows, in its concern that ABC might edit the shows in order to 
fit three commercial-free thirty-minute shows into a ninety-minute 
special with commercials, and in seeking an injunction to prevent the 
broadcast of the edited shows, the comedy troupe demonstrated a keen 
interest in maintaining the artistic integrity of its work. While Monty 
46. Id at 26. 
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Python could have compromised this integrity in order to capture greater 
profits - it could, for example, have agreed to ABC's first proposal to air 
the shows in edited form-the troupe decided not to do so. 
Gilliam provides, as the above discussion suggests, an example of a 
party seeking to use property law in order to vindicate non-market 
values. Monty Python claimed an infringement of a property right in 
order to preserve its non-market interest in its artistic integrity. Instead 
of relying on this non-market interest to support its property claim, 
Monty Python presented its case to the Second Circuit as one primarily 
involving market values.47 
Monty Python claimed a common-law copyright in its script.48 The 
BBC's right to the recorded television shows did not displace this 
copyright, Monty Python maintained, because the shows were derivative 
of the script. The Second Circuit agreed that Monty Python retained its · 
copyright in its scripts and that the agreement between the BBC and 
Time-Life did not derogate from this right.49 The court found that 
ABC infringed this copyright by editing the recorded shows without 
having first consulted with Monty Python. 5° Copyright law is pre-
mised, the court stated, on encouraging the production of artistic work 
by providing adequate market protection to the creators of such work.51 
ABC's broadcast threatened Monty Python's market interest in its shows. 
By distorting the nature of the comedy troupe's work through substantial 
editing, ABC presented Monty Python to its first nationwide American 
audience in an unflattering light. Many members of the audience, 
having never before experienced the comedy of Monty Python, would 
have believed that the ABC broadcasts fairly represented the troupe's 
brand of comedy. Many such members would thus be disinclined to 
patronize the work of Monty Python in the future. This would 
jeopardize the viability of the troupe.52 
47. Id. at 24. 
48. Id at 19 n.3. 
49. Id at 20. 
50. Id at 21. 
51. Id at 23. The court stated, "[C]opyright law should be used to recognize the 
important role of the artist in our society and the need to encourage production and 
dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate legal protection for one who 
submits his work to the public." Id The court also stated, "[T]he law seeks to vindicate 
the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors." Id at 24. 
52. Id at 19. 
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Monty Python did not rest its claim to an injunction solely on its 
economic argument; the troupe also maintained that the court should 
grant the injunction on the basis of its artistic rights.53 The troupe 
argued that it had the moral right not to have its art deformed by 
others.54 The court of appeals agreed with Monty Python that ABC 
had undermined the artistic integrity of the troupe's work by broadcast-
ing the troupe's shows in an edited form. 55 The court also agreed that 
ABC should be held liable for subverting Monty Python's artistic 
integrity. 56 The theory upon which the court based this conclusion 
differed significantly, however, from that proposed by Monty Python. 
The court's theory was firmly rooted in economic analysis. 
The Second Circuit upheld Monty Python's right to the artistic 
integrity of its work not out of a desire to directly further artistic 
integrity but on the basis of protecting Monty Python's market interests 
in its shows.57 Artists, such as the Monty Python troupe, the court 
argued, have a market interest in pleasing their audience. Essentially, 
the court's argument amounts to the following: The more audience 
members there are who enjoy the artist's work, the more willing they 
will be to pay for such enjoyment and the larger the audience will 
become. Therefore, artists create their work, according to this argument, 
in order to suit the tastes of their audience. Artists who cannot make 
their work conform to the tastes of their audience will suffer financially · 
and, eventually, will be driven out of the art market. In this way, the 
market encourages those artists with skill and insight capable of rousing 
the public imagination to continue with their work and encourages the 
rest to change careers. 
Should a third party present the public with a distorted version of an 
artist's work, the argument continues, that third party threatens the 
economic well-being of the artist. This is so because the distortion, if 
significant, undermines the artist's effort to create work that pleases her 
53. Id at 23-24. 
54. Id at 24. Monty Python's claim was one of moral right (droit moral), a right 
recognized in civil-law countries. 
55. Id at 25. The court stated, "We find that the truncated version at times 
omitted the climax of the skits to which appellants' rare brand of humor was leading and 
at other times deleted essential elements in the schematic development of a story line." 
Id 
56. Id 
57. Id at 24. The court asserted, "[T]he economic incentive for artistic and 
intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for American copyright law cannot be 
reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation 
of their work to the public on which the artists are financially dependent." Id (citations 
omitted). 
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or his audience.58 Being less pleased, the artist's audience will pay less 
for the artist's work. The artist will thus suffer financially and will 
produce less work. Such a result is economically inefficient: society 
will be deprived of pleasing artwork. Therefore, in order to encourage 
the production of quality artwork, the law ought to recognize an artist's 
right to the artistic integrity of her or his work.59 
The court of appeals was not oblivious to the salutary consequences 
that its economic analysis had on the vindication of the value of artistic 
integrity.60 In fact, it is possible that the court was motivated to 
construct its economic argument in order to be able to vindicate this 
value. This possibility can be inferred from the fact that the economic 
argument was strained at best. After all, the creation of artwork is 
dissimilar to the creation of widgets. Much of what is presently 
considered "good" art was, at the time of its creation, considered poor 
by the art market.61 This is because talented artists often lead, rather 
than follow, public taste. Thus, there is not necessarily a correlation 
between a work's price on the market and its artistic value. Similarly, 
the idea of tampering does not apply to artwork in the same way that it 
applies to cars or drugs. The distortion of a piece of art may not lessen 
its value, and, in some circumstances, may actually add val-
ue-aesthetically. 62 
The court of appeals' decision to found Monty Python's property right 
in its script on an inapposite economic analogy between artwork and 
manufactured goods rather than on the value of artistic integrity calls for 
an explanation. This Article suggests that the most cogent explanation 
is that property rights are founded on market values. Courts award 
property rights to a good when to do so enhances trade in that good. 
58. Id The court noted, "[I]t is the writer or performer, rather than the network, 
who suffers the consequences of the mutilation, for the public will have only the final 
product by which to evaluate the work." Id. 
59. Id Thus, the law considers the violation of artistic integrity as analogous to 
unfair competition. The court stated, "This statute [Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a)], 
the federal counterpart to state unfair competition laws, has been invoked to prevent 
misrepresentations that may injure plaintiffs business or personal reputation, even where 
no registered trademark is concerned." Id 
60. Id The court stated, "Although such decisions are clothed in terms of 
proprietary right in one's creation, they also properly vindicate the author's personal right 
to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form." Id. 
61. One need only think of the Impressionists as an illustration of this point. 
62. Consider Andy Warhol's use of the artwork on the label of soup cans. 
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D. U.S. Steel: Protection of a Community 
Gilliam illustrates how parties wishing to vindicate some non - market
values inhering in a good can manipulate property law discourse, 
premised on purely economic considerations, to achieve their ends. 
While these parties, and the courts they try to convince, must operate 
within the confines of the goal of promoting trade, they can often 
persuasively argue that granting them property rights achieves this goal. 
It may be that parties make such arguments with a wink and a nod at 
times,_ knowing full well that they are highly contrived, but at other 
times, parties seem actually to believe their economic contentions. 
Nevertheless, parties do not, where possible, attempt to directly found 
their property claims on their non-market interests.63 
Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel 
Corp. 64 provides an example of a party that, in attempting to vindicate 
the non-market value of community, could make no plausible economic 
argument in favor of its claimed property right. The case involves the 
decision by U.S. Steel to shut down two steel mills in Youngstown, 
Ohio. The company's stated reason for shutting the plants down was 
that they were obsolete and thus unprofitable.65 
The community of Youngstown was built around steel and, in 
particular, around U.S. Steel. Because of steel there were jobs, there 
were schools, there were roads, and there was expansion.66 The fate 
of the community was intimately tied to the future of U.S. Steel's two 
mills. Given this situation, the company's decision to leave Youngstown 
was likely to completely devastate the community.67 
In order to avoid the devastation of their community, the local steel 
workers union, the local congressman, and the Attorney General of Ohio 
commenced an action against U.S. Steel in an attempt to force the 
company to keep the two mills operational and, in the alternative, to sell 
63. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (dealing with the 
right of a publicity interest in one's voice). 
Id 
64. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). 
65. Id at 1265. 
66. As the trial judge observed: 
Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has been happening for 
many years because of steel. Schools have been built, roads have been built. 
Expansion that has taken place is because of steel. And to accommodate that 
industry, lives and destinies of the inhabitants of that community were based 
and planned on the basis of that institution: Steel. 
67. Id The court stated, "While we cannot read the future of Youngstown from 
this record, what the record does indicate clearly is that we deal with an economic 
tragedy of major proportion to Youngstown and Ohio's Mahoning Valley." Id 
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the mills to the community.68 U.S. Steel claimed that it had the 
absolute right to make the business decision to shut down the plants. 
When the union sought to negotiate for the purchase of the mills, U.S. 
Steel refused, claiming that it feared the government would subsidize the 
operation of the mills to the competitive detriment of the company.69 
At the pre-trial hearing, the court was extremely sympathetic to the 
position taken by the union and the community. Following a full 
hearing, however, the district judge found himself unable to accord the 
union and community a property right in the mills. While he stated his 
continued belief that U.S. Steel ought not to be permitted to devastate 
the Youngstown community by closing the plants,70 he held that there 
was no authority upon which he could found a property right in the 
community to prevent this from happening.71 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in dealing with the appeal, 
also expressed deep sympathy for the plight of the Youngstown 
community.72 The appeals court found itself in the same position, 
however, as had the trial court: it could find no authority to support the 
grant of a property right to the community. 73 The court therefore held 
that it could offer the Youngstown community no assistance. In its 
68. Id at 1265-66. 
69. Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
617 (1988). 
70. U.S. Steel, 631 F.2d at 1266. The trial judge stated, "United States Steel 
should not be permitted to leave the Youngstown area devastated after drawing from the 
lifeblood of the community for so many years." Id 
71. Id The court stated, "Unfortunately, the mechanism to reach this ideal 
settlement, to recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in the code of 
laws of our nation." Id. 
72. Id at 1280. The court stated, "This court has examined these allegations with 
care and with great sympathy for the community interest reflected therein." Id 
73. Like the district court, the court of appeals searched high and low for authority 
on which to base a property right for the community: 
Id 
Our problem in dealing with plaintiffs fourth cause of action is one of 
authority. Neither in brief nor oral argument have plaintiffs pointed to any 
constitutional provision contained in· either the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the State of Ohio, nor any law enacted by the 
United States Congress or the Legislature of Ohio, nor any case decided by the 
courts of either of these jurisdictions which would convey authority to this 
court to require the United States Steel Corporation to continue operations in 
Youngstown which its officers and Board of Directors had decided to 
discontinue on the basis of unprofitability. 
1183 
opinion, only the legislature could resolve all the policy issues sunrround-
ing the question of plant closings.74 
The U.S. Steel case is one in which strong non-market values 
supported the recognition of a community property right in the mills 
while market values militated against such a recognition. Without the 
steel mills, Youngstown was in desperate shape. Not only were some 
13,000 jobs lost as a result of the closings,75 but the focus of the 
community was lost. With a property right to the mills, the community 
would have been able to force U.S. Steel to sell it the mills or, at least, 
to help establish some other industry to take the place of the one 
founded on steel. Without such a property right, the community was 
unable to prevent the tragedy that befell it. 
On the other hand, the goal of enhancing trade in goods, in this case 
steel mills, is best ensured by withholding a property right from the 
community. Trade in mills requires clear title. If workers or members 
of the community can simply pick up a property interest in a plant by 
working at the plant or living nearby, then title to the plant will be 
uncertain. This will hurt trade in two ways. First, managers of a mill 
will never know to whom they are responsible. As individuals in the 
community amass proprietary interests in the mill, ownership in the mill 
will become increasingly diluted. It will become unclear to management 
from whom, among the mass of owners, they are to take instructions. 
Second, prospective purchasers will be wary of buying the plant for fear 
that the ostensible owners cannot actually convey full title. 76 
Trade is enhanced by encouraging individuals to create goods. The 
more goods that are created, the more there is to trade. Thus, trade is 
enhanced when individuals build mills. Individuals will not build mills, 
however, unless they know they will reap the financial rewards from 
doing so. Property rights provide such individuals with the security that 
they, to the exclusion of all others, will be able to profit from the mills 
that they construct. If, however, the community can gain competing 
property rights to mills, individuals will lose this security. They will 
thus be less willing to invest in the construction of steel mills. 
Individuals are also less likely to invest in a mill where they do not 
control how their investment will be used. Individuals who risk their 
capital want to ensure that this capital is used wisely. They therefore 
74. Id. at 1282. "In the view of this court, formulation of public policy on the 
great issues involved in plant closings and removals is clearly the responsibility of the 
legislatures of the states or of the Congress of the United States." Id. 
75. Singer, supra note 69, at 615 n.9. 
76. Similarly, lenders may be wary of loaning money on the security of a plant, 
the ownership of which is in doubt. 
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wish to control the use to which their money is put. If others gain 
property rights to one's mill, however, one not only must share the mill 
itself but must also share control over its capital. This added risk 
discourages investment. 
The U.S. Steel case thus provides an example of a showdown between 
community and market values. While the judges were emotionally 
pulled toward vindicating community values above market values, once 
engaged in property law discourse they opted to uphold market over 
community values. The judges refused to grant a property right that 
would have encouraged what they all acknowledged to be socially useful 
conduct-the preservation of the Youngstown community-and agreed 
to uphold a property right-that of U.S. Steel to the mills-that all 
understood would lead to socially harmful conduct, the devastation of 
Youngstown. 
Confronted by the fact that it had only a non-economic argument 
when property law appeared to require an economic one, the Youngs-
town community attempted to convince the court of appeals that it was 
competent to consider non-market values in deciding whether to award 
the community a property right in the mills. To this end, the community 
relied on one sentence from the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Munn v. Illinois: 77 "So, too, in matters which do affect the public 
interest, and as to which legislative control may be exercised, ifthere are 
no statutory regulations upon the subject, the courts must determine what 
is reasonable."78 In that case, the Illinois Legislature set minimum 
grain storage charges in Chicago and other large cities in the state. The 
Munn Court made the quoted statement in the course of affirming the 
state's authority to impose such minimum charges. The Youngstown 
community argued that, given the lack of legislative guidance in the area 
of community ownership of manufacturing plants, the court had to 
consider all values inhering in the mills, not simply market values, 
before making its determination. 79 
The U.S. Steel court rejected Youngstown's argument that courts were 
competent to address non-economic as well as economic arguments in 
deciding property law cases. The court held that the Munn statement 
77. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 




provided an insufficient basis for the court to order U.S. Steel to 
continue the operation of the two mills despite their unprofitability.80 
The court noted that the United States had faced a long history of plant 
shut-downs. Determining how to respond to such shut-downs, the court 
held, implicated a great number of policy questions that courts are 
institutionally incompetent to consider.81 For this reason, it refused to 
consider Youngstown's claim that it needed a property right in the mills 
in order to uphold the value of community. 82 
As the Chakrabarty, Gilliam, and U.S. Steel cases illustrate, property 
discourse in American courts focuses exclusively on market values. 
Parties who cannot explain in economic terms why the court ought to 
grant property rights will not be granted such rights. Parties who cannot 
found their opposition to the grant of property rights on market 
principles will fail to block the allocation of such rights. Because of 
their assumption that a good's market price is epiphenomena! of all the 
various ways in which people value that good, courts remain confident 
that their property analysis vindicates all values inhering in a particular 
good. The cases discussed above suggest that such confidence may be 
misplaced. The ramifications of this potentially ill-founded confidence 
may become especially apparent in the area of human biotechnology-an 
area where so many non-market values are implicated. 
II. VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BODY AND HUMAN HEALTH 
The way each of us values the goods around us is complex, occasion-
ally counter-intuitive, and often conflicting. We may value goods both 
instrumentally-as a means of transportation, as a source of nutrients, or 
as a way to stay warm-and intrinsically-as a symbol of community, 
competition, or power. 
According to Charles Taylor, we make determinations within a moral 
landscape, or "framework," the features of which are the values that we 
hold. 83 How we place ourselves within that landscape and how we 
orient ourselves with respect to those values define, in large part, who 
80. Id. at 1282. "We find no ground to extend it to assert judicial power to order 
a steel manufacturing corporation to continue the operation of two plants which it (and 
a District Court on competent evidence) have found to be unprofitable." Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Recall that the Court in Chakrabarty similarly relied on this judicial 
incompetency argument to avoid consideration of non-economic values (in that case, 
environmental safety and human health). Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 
(1980). 
83. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
IDENTITY 26 (1989). Taylor stated, "Frameworks provide the background, explicit or 
implicit, for our moral judgments, intuitions, or reactions .... " Id. 
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we are. 84 In this landscape, some features appear more prominent or 
closer to us than do others: these are the values that are most important 
or most implicated in the decision before us. When we interact with a 
good-when we make a decision about that good-we do so within the 
framework of this landscape. This Part begins the task-one that will 
not be completed-of setting out some of the more prominent features 
in the moral landscape relating to the human body and human health. 
The concept of individual frameworks implies that frameworks vary 
not only from person to person within a given culture-a culture based 
on shared beliefs and values-but even more so between cultures. 
Therefore, it is not claimed that those features of the moral landscape 
relating to the human body and human health that are laid out apply to 
all people or cultures equally. 85 This analysis, therefore, is restricted 
to contemporary American society. 
A. The Human Body 
1. The Body and Its Values 
The human body reflects the society in which it exists. Social 
customs and institutions shape or mark the body directly, for example, 
through hairstyle, the piercing of ears, make-up, and the removal of 
facial hair. Customs and institutions also shape or mark the body 
indirectly, for example, through posture, facial expression, intonation, 
and scent. The body, according to Michel Foucault,86 is not so much 
refined as it is molded by social institutions such as the family, the 
school, the church, the workplace, and the community. According to 
this view, one cannot fully describe the human body apart from the 
society in which it exists. 87 In trying to understand the signification of 
84. Id at 27-28. "[Those suffering from an 'identity crisis'] lack a frame or 
horizon within which things can take on a stable significance, within which some life 
possibilities can be seen as good or meaningful, others as bad or trivial." Id. 
85. However, the author believes that at some level most apply to all cultures. 
86. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975). 
87. Nancy Fraser, Foucault's Body-Language: A Post-Humanist Political 
Rhetoric?, 61 SALMAGUNDI 55, 64 (1983); see also JANA SAWICKI, DISCIPLINING 
FOUCAULT: FEMINISM, POWER, AND THE BODY 80 (1991). 
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the human body-what we understand the body and its components to 
mean-one must analyze the body within the context of a given society. 
2. The Body and Politics 
In Western societies, the human body has taken on various meanings 
within the political realm. The body of the Middle Ages was an organic 
whole reflecting both the cosmological88 and the political89 orders. 
This body was harmonious, proportional, monumental, and male.90 
The metaphorical use of the body symbolized the hierarchy within 
society: the head representing Christ, the eyes symbolizing the Church, 
the chest and arms denoting lay power, and the lower limbs and 
extremities corresponding to the masses.91 
In the modem era, this organic view of the body gave way to a 
mechanical understanding of the body. No longer was the body a sacred 
incarnation of cosmological truth; rather, it was a worldly machine that 
could be made transparent through technology.92 The modern body 
was an isolated unit no longer connected to the cosmos. Within the 
body, each organ performed its function in isolation. The then-current 
understanding of the body was therefore a reductionist one. With 
increasing knowledge, this reduction went further, from organ, to cell, 
to gene. 
This change of perspective led to the view that society was not a 
single body, but was composed of separate bodies whose relationship to 
one another was contingent.93 The life of the individual, and no longer 
the life of the body politic, was paramount. The laborer, who had 
previously been metaphorically understood as the legs of the body 
politic, became an individual body like every other individual body in 
88. David M. Levin & George F. Solomon, The Discursive Formation of the Body 
in the History of Medicine, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 515, 523 (1990). See Mark Kidel & 
Susan Rowe-Leete, Mapping the Body, in 3 FRAGMENTS FOR A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN 
BODY 448, 465-66 (Michel Feher et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter FRAGMENTS] for a 
pictorial illustration of the link between the body and the cosmos. 
89. Jacques Le Goff, Head or Heart? The Political Use of Body Metaphors in the 
Middle Ages, in FRAGMENTS, supra note 88, at 13; Randall McGowen, The Body and 
Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England, 59 J. Moo. HIST. 651, 654 (1987). 
90. Laurie Finke, Mystical Bodies and the Dialogics of Vision, 67 PHILOLOGICAL 
Q. 439, 444 (1988). Women and other marginal groups were thought to be grotesque 
forms of this classic body. Id. 
91. Le Goff, supra note 89, at 16-17. 
92. Levin & Solomon, supra note 88, at 519. 
93. McGowen, supra note 89, at 670. 
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society.94 The fact that each of us is embodied in similar bodies led to 
the replacement of a hierarchy of people with an equality of bodies. 
3. The Body, Culture, and Self-Definition 
Culture, like the political sphere of human life, imprints itself upon the 
body. Culture directly marks the body through posture, walking, gait, 
accent, and facial expressions. For example, British children are said to 
learn to hold their eyebrows in a raised position during their first few 
months of life.95 Such cultural marks on the body forever associate the 
individual with the culture of his or her birth or development. In a 
similar manner, one's status within society is marked upon the body. 
Not only Eliza Doolittle's accent, but her posture and manner of 
walking, had to be altered so that she could pass as an aristocrat. Caste 
marks, clothing, and hair styles also display the wearer's place and status 
within society. 
Just as the body is a symbol of cultural boundary, it is also a symbol 
of the boundary between individuals. Our bodies help to delineate the 
"me" from the surrounding universe. The infant's discovery of itself 
occurs, according to Jacques Lacan, at the moment the infant recognizes 
its body in a mirror.96 When an infant reaches the "mirror stage," he 
or she for the first time understands that the image in the mirror is him 
or herself. At this instant, the infant becomes a subjective being. That 
is, by recognizing its body as its self, the infant becomes a subject, a 
human individual. And by associating its own body with "me," the 
infant comes to recognize the existence of others; for the only way to 
recognize itself as a distinct entity is for the infant to differentiate its 
body, and hence itself, from others. 97 
What is within the boundary of the self is very different from what is 
outside of this boundary. For example, there is an immense difference 
between saliva in our mouths and saliva we have spit out. While we 
would unhesitatingly swallow the former, we are generally loathe to 
94. Pasi Falk, Corporealityand Its Fates in History, 28 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 115, 
122 (1985). 
95. ELAINE SCARRY, The BODY IN PAIN: The MAKING AND UNMAKING OF The
WORLD 109 (1985). 
96. See the discussionofLacan' s mirror stage in CA THERINE CLEMENT, The LIVES 
AND LEGENDS OF JACQUES LACAN 84-92 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1983). 
97. JULIET MITCHELL, PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND FEMINISM 384-86 (1975). 
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swallow the latter.98 Moreover, the boundary between what is "us" and 
what is not is far from clear and does not necessarily depend on the 
contours of our material body. Consider, for example, seating arrange-
ments on a subway car, bus, or train. People seem to naturally space 
themselves out over the seats, each respecting the "space" around the 
others. We generally consider it rude to sit close to another person 
when there is open seating available. On the other hand, when a subway 
car is crowded, one feels little discomfort when someone not only sits 
near to one but actually touches one's body. 
Further, the boundary between what is us and what is outside need not 
correspond with the outside of the physical body. When an arm or leg 
is amputated, amputees often still consider the lost limb as part of 
themselves. Thus, a pyrophobic patient may become truly fearful when 
the amputated limb is cremated.99 The boundary between us and the 
surrounding world can even occur within the body proper. For example, 
Dr. Oliver Sacks describes a patient who failed to recognize his own leg 
as part of himself. 100 
The body is implicated far beyond this first differentiation of the "me" 
from the "they." It helps to shape each individual's understanding of her 
or himself and her or his place within society. For example, Hegel 
suggests that the will is alive in the body and this state of being is the 
pre-condition for every mode of existence, 101 from the individual, to 
the family, to society, to the state, and, ultimately, to world history. The 
human body is thus intrinsically valuable as the paradigmatic expression 
of the will in the external sphere. It is also instrumentally valuable as 
the pre-condition to every mode of existence. Each individual values 
her or his body as the embodiment of freedom and as the vehicle 
through which she or he senses the external world. 102 To others, the 
body of a person is what they recognize as that person. 103 
Alternatively, drawing on the learning of Michel Foucault, we in this 
society value human bodies as the site of the development of the "self." 
The body is the raw material for social forces that act upon it to form 
98. DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 414 (1991). 
99. See Browning v. Norton-Children's Hosp., 504 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1974). 
100. OLIVER SACKS, The Man Who Fell Out of Bed, in The MAN WHO MISTOOK 
HIS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL TALES 55 (1987). 
IOI. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 1 47 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) 
(1821). (As the Philosophy of Right is divided into paragraphs, remarks to paragraphs, 
and additions to paragraphs, "¶"followed by a number will refer to paragraph numbers, 
and "1" followed by a number and an "R" will refer to the remarks found beneath the 
paragraph indicated by the number.) 
102. Id 1 48R. 
103. Id 
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both our conceptions of the body and of the soul. 104 In this view, the 
body is socially created, shaped by power and knowledge relations. In 
contradistinction to the Hegelian framework, the body is not valued as 
the embodiment of the soul's freedom, but is seen as the prisoner of the 
soul. 105
4. The Body and Ritual 
The body figures prominently in solemnization rituals. 106 Marriage, 
for example, was traditionally consummated by sexual intercourse. In 
this way, the married couple was thought to become one flesh. 107 In 
the Old Testament important vows are formalized by placing the hand 
under the thigh. 108 Contemporary Western society continues to rely on 
body symbolism to formalize its rituals. Handshakes seal a deal109 and 
a person who is telling the truth looks the listener in the eye. 
Less formal initiation rituals greet newborns in Western and other 
societies. Parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and friends each examine 
the newborn to determine whether the infant's nose more closely 
resembles that of the father or the mother, whether the baby has the 
grandfather's or grandmother's eyes, or whether the child's smile takes 
after one side of the family or the other. In this way, the physical 
characteristics of the child link him or her to past generations and situate 
the infant within a larger social group. 
Funerals represent another important ceremony that centers on the 
body. By honoring the deceased's body, we pay homage to the 
deceased. Thus, we construct tombs to house the corpses of our great 
leaders, from kings and queens to Napoleon and Lenin. We also 
preserve parts of the deceased's body as relics. 
Relics from the bodies of saints have been particularly venerated. 
Umbrian peasants, around the year 1000, are recorded to have wished to 
104. FOUCAULT, supra note 86, at 25-30. 
105. Id at 30. 
106. The author is indebted to William Miller for drawing his attention to this use 
of the body. 
107. Genesis 2:24. 
108. See Genesis 24:9: 
So the servant put his hand under the thigh of Abraham his master, and swore 
to him concerning this matter. 
109. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), 
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988). 
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kill Saint Romuald in order to make sure his bones would not be 
lost. 110 At the death of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Fossanuova monks 
decapitated, boiled, and preserved the saint's body. While Saint 
Elizabeth of Hungary was lying in state in 1231, worshippers cut off 
parts of her body to preserve them as relics. Similarly, at the funeral of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini, some of the faithful tore at his body in order 
to possess a relic. 111 
This tradition of collecting relics from the dead continues in Western 
culture, albeit in a different form. Instead of preserving a finger or 
some hair from the deceased, we now collect photographs. Photographs, 
being a representation of the body of the deceased, more than letters or 
drawings, serve the same purpose as did relics in the past: they help us 
remember and honor our ancestors. Whether we look at them often or 
infrequently, photographs are among our most precious treasures. This 
is perhaps why, for example, following the death of a loved one, it is 
not uncommon for a family to lovingly peruse the deceased's collection 
of photographs and to distribute them equitably among family members. 
Rituals of sharing also involve the body. In his expansion upon an 
argument credited to Richard Titmuss, 112 Thomas Murray argues that 
gifts of the body-for example, blood and kidneys-to strangers affirm 
the "quintessentially human"113 gift of solidarity. "Blood represents 
individual life and vitality, and at the same time it signifies the oldest, 
most primitive tie that affirms solidarity and binds people to one 
another. " 114 
5. The Sacred Body and the Profane Body 
Perhaps the area in which the human body has its richest symbolism 
is in connection with that which is sacred and that which is profane. 
The human body is an earthly reflection of the divine: according to 
Western religions, our bodies are made in the image of God. 115 At the 
110. This and the following two examples are discussed in J. HUIZINGA, The
WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 150 (1954). 
111. John Kifner, Amid Frenzy, Iranians Bury The Ayatollah, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
1989, at Al. 
112. RICHARD M. Titmuss, the GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO 
SOCIAL POLICY (1971). 
113. Thomas H. Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Apr. 1987, at 30, 36. 
114. Id. 
115. Genesisl:27: 
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; 
male and female he created them. 
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same time, the body symbolizes the profane. For example, giving in to 
one's "fleshly" desires or one's appetites is often considered a sin. 
Blood is accorded a sacred place among the body's components and 
is associated with life itself. When God bade Noah to be fruitful and 
multiply and to eat every living thing, God forbade the consumption of 
blood. "Only you shall not eat flesh with its life, that is, its blood. For 
your lifeblood I will surely require a reckoning; of every beast I will 
require it and of man."116 Blood has been granted the ability to speak 
for the deceased after death. Thus, Abel's blood spoke to God with 
news of his murder. 117 In medieval northern Albania, a bottle of a 
victim's blood was watched by kin to see if it "boiled," or fermented. 
If the blood did boil, vengeance was immediately taken; otherwise, 
compensation for the death was accepted. 118 
Parallel to the body's representation of the sacred, it symbolizes the 
profane. In Christian belief, the body signifies both sin and dirt. Thus, 
to remove the taint of original sin, the body must be ritually bathed in 
baptism. The metaphorical link between sin and dirt is continued 
through the foot washing ceremony. Once cleansed (baptized) of dirt 
(sin), the body (soul) need only be cleansed where it touches the earth 
(vice). Thus, Jesus taught that "[h]e who has bathed does not need to 
wash except for his feet, but he is clean all over."119 
The female body, in particular, has been associated with the profane. 
In Western culture, women have been variously labelled as sexually 
insatiable, 120 imperfect, 121 and grotesque. 122 The belief in the pro-
fanity of the female· body has worked itself into beliefs concerning 
conception. According to one such belief, while the female body was 
given credit for the formation of the material parts of the fetus, the male 
body was thought to contribute the more important form or essence of 
116. Genesis 9:4-5; see also Deuteronomy 12:16. 
117. Genesis4:10: 
And the LORD said, "What have you done? The voice of your brother's blood 
is crying to me from the ground." 
118. William I. Miller, Choosing the Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodfeud in 
Medieval Iceland and England, 1 L. & HIST. REV. 159, 182 n.92 (1983). 
119. John.13:10. 
120. loan P. Culianu, A Corpus for the Body, 63 J. Mod. HIST. 61, 71 (1991). 
121. Giulia Sissa, Subtle Bodies, in FRAGMENTS, supra note 88, at 136. Aristotle 
thought that the birth of a female child demonstrated some infirmity in the father. Id. 
122. Finke, supra note 90, at 444. 
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the child. 123 This dichotomy between idea and matter is well illustrat-
ed in the story of Jesus's conception. Jesus was conceived through the 
ethereal contribution of the Holy Spirit and the material contribution of 
Mary. 124 The profanity of the female body was somewhat alleviated 
in this case because Mary was a virgin, the least profane of female 
bodies. 
Sin itself has been thought to mark the body. Red hair has been 
associated with the presence of the devil while green eyes are said to be 
a sign of jealousy. To punish Eve for eating the apple from the tree of 
knowledge, God inflicted the pain of childbirth upon women's bod-
ies.125 Similarly, Cain's body was marked by God as a sign of Cain's 
guilt and a sign that none should kill him. 126 The belief that sin marks 
the body is tragically demonstrated today by those who preach that 
AIDS is a punishment from God for immoral sexual conduct. 127 
The profane nature of the human body, however, is not always 
condemned. In fact, through clothing, make-up, and hairstyles, the 
sexuality of the body, principally the female body, is heightened. High-
heeled shoes, for example, emphasize hip movement and cause both 
buttocks and chest to protrude. 128 Similarly, cosmetics accentuate the 
eyes, increasing sexual attractiveness. 129 To a lesser extent, men's 
clothing also enhances sexual appeal: shoulder pads enhance the 
appearance of upper body strength while neckties serve as phallic 
symbols. 
The symbolism of the human body, as this cursory examination shows, 
is rich and varied within Western culture. The body signifies the 
relation between individual and world, individual and state, and the 
sacred and the profane. While some have argued that there is no a priori 
reason for according the body a prominent position in our understanding 
of ourselves and our world, 130 it appears to be a contingent truth that 
123. Sissa, supra note 121, at 139-40. 
124. Luke 1:26-41. 
125. Genesis 3:16. 
126. Genesis4:15. 
127. See, e.g., Peter Steinfels, AIDS Provokes Theological Second Thoughts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, § 4, at 5 (referring to the publicly professed position of the 
American Council of Christian Churches); Edward Tivnan, Homosexuals and the 
Churches,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 84 (referring to the Archbishop 
of Philadelphia's statement that "[t]he spread of AIDS is an act of vengeance against the 
sin of homosexuality"). 
128 Culianu, supra note 120, at 78. 
129. Id at 79. 
130. See Thomas H. Murray, On the Human Body as Property: The Meaning of 
Embodiment, Markets, and the Meaning of Strangers, 20 J.L. REFORM I 055, 1064-68 
(1987) (discussing the views of Joseph Fletcher and H. Tristam Engelhardt). 
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every human culture invests the body with deep symbolic meaning. Our 
bodies symbolically link us to our ancestors, our community, and our 
children. Our understanding of our own identity is profoundly 
influenced by our bodies and the meanings we attach to them. 
B. Human Health 
The ways we value human health overlap, for obvious reasons, with 
the ways we value the human body. Because health describes a state of 
the body (although a highly ambiguous, and as discussed below, 
culturally contingent one), many of the values identified above in the 
discussion of the body apply to human health. Nonetheless, health and 
the body are distinct goods. Health relates not only to the physical 
body, but to the mind; it denotes not so much the ideal of a perfect body 
but the state of a relative lack of illness. Unlike the body, health cannot 
be seen, although it may be perceived. It is described not by what it is, 
but by what it is not-the absence of illness, suffering, and pain. 
1. Health and Politics 
Health is both a metaphor for politics and a metaphor used in politics 
to justify or support certain actions. We say that one of the goals of 
politics is to "heal" rifts between communities. Racial intolerance, 
spousal assault, and other social "ills" are "open sores" in our society. 
Poverty and homelessness are said to be "epidemic." 
We not only use the analogy between health and politics to give color 
to our description of politics, but we apply our understanding of health 
in order to understand politics. Politicians ask us "to take our medicine" 
in order to bring the economy back to "health." In the eighteenth 
century, capital punishment was seen as a "cure" for illness in the body 
politic. 131 Those who stole or murdered endangered the life of the 
body politic to the same extent as a gangrenous limb threatened the life 
of the human body. The remedy, in both cases, was amputation. 132 
Judges pronouncing sentences. of death were, therefore, in the same
131. McGowen, supra note 89. 
132. Id at 661. 
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position as physicians amputating legs: both were healing the sickness 
of the body. 133 
The analogy between health and politics is also apparent in literature. 
Albert Camus in his book, The Plague, 134 uses a fictional plague 
devastating a French city as a metaphor for the Nazi occupation of 
France during World War ll. 135 By viewing the Nazi occupation as a 
plague, Camus explored the political and bureaucratic reasons behind 
France's sudden fall to Germany, 136 the lack of hope that Germany 
could be defeated, 137 and the evolution, in the inhuman face of Na-
zism, of the Resistance into a militaristic and cut-throat force. 138 The 
analogy between a plague and Nazism works, in large part, because of 
the analogy between political community and the body: just as the 
human body may sometimes become ill and require unpleasant and 
painful medical attention, so too the body politic may occasionally 
become ill and require harsh and painful treatment in the hands of 
community leaders. 
The Nazis themselves used the analogy between health and politics to 
further their program of genocide. The Nazis portrayed Jews, Slavs, and 
Gypsies as "racial parasites" who represented a health threat to Germany 
because their genes would weaken the Aryan gene pool. 139 The 
medical analogy carried through to the death camps. The process of 
selection for those who would be sent to the gas chambers resembled 
133. Id at 664. 
134. ALBERT CAMUS, LA PESTE (1947). 
135. Allen Thiher, Teaching the Historical Context o/The Plague, in APPROACHES 
TO TEACHING CAMUS'S THE PLAGUE 90, 96 (Steven G. Kellman ed., 1985): 
Id 
The Plague is perhaps most clearly referential in the way it documents the 
details of how daily life goes on in the face of an occupying army. The 
rationing of food, the hedonistic drinking, the reruns of films in the cinemas, 
the hoarding of scarce goods and the organizing of a black market, the closing 
of shops left abandoned by the "departed," the imposing of curfews, the 
creation of "isolation camps" for mass internments, the inordinate demands 
made on one's physical stamina-these and many other details offer exact 
parallels with life during the Occupation. 
136. Id at 95. 
137. Id at 97. 
138. Id Thiher stated, "The Resistance offers, then, a primary lesson in how the 
need to destroy the inhuman has a diabolical capacity to convert virtuous persons into 
the inhuman themselves--out of virtuous necessity." Id 
139. Alfons Labisch, The Social Construction of Health: From Early Modern Times 
to the Beginnings of the Industrialization, in THE SOCIAL CONS1RUCTION OF ILLNESS 
85, 97-98 (Jens Lachmund & Gunnar Stollberg eds., 1992); JOEL RICHMAN, MEDICINE 
AND HEALTH 10 (1987). 
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medical triage: inmates undressed in "medical blocks" and were used 
for medical "experimentation."140 
Another connection between health and politics is the notion that good 
citizenship requires that we keep ourselves in good health. This 
connection is currently illustrated in debates surrounding smoking, the 
wearing of seat-belts in automobiles, and the wearing of bicycle helmets. 
Plato understood health to be a sound pattern of living and thought that 
those who became ill, other than by reason of epidemic, had been 
morally irresponsible. 141 
Health practitioners, while occupying a position of moral neutrali-
ty-they do not usually tell us what is morally right or wrong-dispense 
morally loaded diagnoses by labelling certain pains and certain 
conditions as illness while refusing to recognize others as such. 142 
This is a double-edged sword. If one's behavior is labelled "illness," 
whether it be homosexuality or stress from an unsatisfying occupation, 
then many members of society, if not most, will view the behavior as a 
personal inconvenience or tragedy and not as a political statement. If 
one's behavior is not labelled "illness"-for example, if a physician says 
that a loved one did not kill him or herself because of a mental disability 
140. RICHMAN, supra note 139, at 10-11. 
141. Julius Moravcsik, Ancient and Modern Conceptions of Health and Medicine, 
1 J. MED. & PHIL. 337, 342 (1976). 
142. lvAN ILLICH, LIMITS TO MEDICINE 54 (1976). The author states, 
The physician decides what is a symptom and who is sick. He [or she] is a 
moral entrepreneur, charged with inquisitorial powers to discover certain 
wrongs to be righted. Medicine, like all crusades, creates a new group of 
outsiders each time it makes a new diagnosis stick. Morality is as implicit in 
sickness as it is in crime or in sin. 
Id. Masturbation and menopause offer two examples of conditions that have been 
transformed from the realm of the normal to the realm of the diseased or vice versa. A 
hundred years ago, physicians wrote of masturbation as an illness leading to general 
debility that was cured by calming the nerves, hard work, tonics, sedatives, narcotics, 
restraining devices, circumcision ( of males and females), and other intrusive procedures. 
PETER E.S. FREUND & MEREDITH B. MCGUIRE, HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND THE SOCIAL 
BODY: A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 206-07 (1991). Masturbation is no longer viewed as 
a disease and, in fact, is considered to be normal. Id. at 207. Menopause was, up to the 
last half century, understood as simply a normal part of aging. Id. at 209. Today, 
however, it is a deficiency disease that is treatable through estrogen supplements. Id. at 
210. 
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and thus committed "suicide" rather than died of an illness-one may be 
subjected to social sanction.143 
Physicians also exercise social control by discovering the cause, or 
etiology, of disease. The cause of disease is located within the patient's 
body rather than in environmental, occupational, social, or political 
circumstances. 144 Thus, instead of working to reduce occupational 
hazards, we counsel those who possess a susceptibility to particular 
illnesses to seek another job. 145 By looking at the patient's body to 
discover the etiology of disease, health care professionals place 
responsibility for disease on the patient. Individuals choose to take 
health risks, accept hazardous jobs, and live near polluted water. The 
social or environmental conditions leading to disease are not to 
blame. 146 By focusing on the individual rather than on the social, 
environmental, and political surroundings of the individual, medicine 
misses much. As Freund & McGuire stated: "Instead of examining the 
work conditions that create stress, attention is focused on how adequate-
ly the individual responds to stress. Instead of looking at the marital, 
family, or work pressures of a compulsive overeater or smoker, emphasis 
is placed upon the individual's will power to control personal behav-
ior."147 
A third way that physicians exert social control is through the 
physician-patient relationship. A patient visiting a physician not only 
lacks the physician's expertise, but is anxious about the result of the 
encounter. 148 Physicians control the flow of information both from the 
patient to the physician-through an interview process-and from the 
143. ILLICH, supra note 142, at 54; see discussion infra notes 296-97 and 
accompanying text. 
144. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 6-7, 217-18. 
145. Id. at 217-18. Consider the following statement about susceptibility to cancer: 
"Recent research shows cancer is not primarily caused by poisons spewed out by 
uncaring industry. Rather, the villain appears to be an individual's own genetic 
susceptibilities." Genetic Signposts on the Road to Cancer, GLOBE & MAIL, June 11, 
1994, at D8. See also ILLICH, supra note 142, at 51: 
[Medicine] serves to legitimize social arrangements into which many people 
do not fit. It labels the handicapped as unfit and breeds ever new categories 
of patients. People who are angered, sickened, and impaired by their industrial 
labour and leisure can escape only into a life under medical supervision and 
are thereby seduced or disqualified from political struggle for a healthier 
world. 
146. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 218. 
147. Id. Alternatively, we find the cause for the individual's obesity in her or his 
genes. See Stephen Strauss, Research Team Pinpoints Gene that Causes Obesity, GLOBE 
& MAIL, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al. 
148. FREUND & MCGUIRE, supra note 142, at 232; IRVING K. ZOLA, SOCIO-
MEDICAL INQUIRIES 219 (1983). 
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physician to the patient. 149 The nature of physical examinations may 
lead the patient to feel awkward, if not embarrassed. 150 Physicians 
concentrate on the efficient use of their time and try to avoid spending 
time with patients who they perceive to be contributing to their own 
illness by their lifestyle or their failure to accept treatment. 151 Physi-
cians adopt a scientific approach to disease in which the causes of 
disease can be rationally explained.152 Thus, emotional or social 
aspects of a patient's illness are generally not of concern to the 
physician. 153 By adopting a scientific, rather than sociological, 
approach to disease, physicians tend to rely more on technology than on 
counselling or other non-intrusive measures and express a concomitant 
concern for elongating life rather than improving quality of life. 154 
2. Health and Culture 
What we understand to be health and our obligation to be healthy is 
dependent on our self-understanding. The understanding of what it is to 
be healthy varies from culture to culture. 155 Thus, being in a particular 
state may be labelled "ill" by members of one ethnic group and not ill 
by members of another group, or by the same group at another time. 
Our language reflects this change of labels. Where once a person was 
considered "disabled" by a condition, whether physical or mental, and 
unable to function in society, that person is now referred to as "chal-
lenged" by the condition. 156 
Most health care is provided by non-professionals in non-institutional 
settings. We self-administer dietary restrictions and medicine and curtail 
certain activity to stave off or treat illness. 157 Other than self-care, 
149. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 233-34. 
150. ZOLA, supra note 148, at 220. 
151. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 240, 243-44. 
152. Id. at 221, 225. 
153. Id. at 245. The authors stated, "[D]octors are socialized to view the 
nonbiophysical aspects [of disease] as 'fuzzy,' 'soft' facts that are ultimately irrelevant 
to their essential task." Id. 
154. Id. at 255. 
155. RICHMAN, supra note 139, at 20-21; ZOLA, supra note 148, at 86-108; ILLICH, 
supra note 142, at 134; Meredith B. McGuire, Health and Spirituality as Contemporary 
Concerns, 527 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 144, 146 (1993); MARGARET 
READ, CULTURE, HEALTH, AND DISEASE 24 (1966). 
156. See, e.g., WILL WRIGHT, THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF HEALTH 112-13 (1982). 
157. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 185. 
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family members and friends provide the bulk of health care services, 
such as providing food, changing dressings, administering medication, 
and monitoring symptoms. 158 The decision to pass on a condition to 
a health care professional depends on various factors. These factors 
include: whether we consider the condition abnormal or simply the 
result of a hectic life, whether we believe the condition to be caused by 
non-physical factors, such as emotions or spirits, and the social 
expectation of how to deal with the condition. 159 
The way in which a society determines how to deliver health services 
to its members also points to the role that the values of community and 
sharing play within that society. 160 Where health services are granted 
to individuals as a right of citizenship, health is understood, at least in 
part, as the concern of the community rather than of the individual. On 
the other hand, where, as in the United States, no universal health 
coverage is available, the value of individualism is paramount. 
3. Health, Spirituality, and Religion 
Religious salvation also has strong metaphorical links to health and 
healing. "Salvation is basically and essentially healing, the re-establish-
ment of a whole that was broken, disrupted, disintegrated."161 Jesus's 
ability to heal the blind, the lame, and the lepers supported the claim 
that he was the Messiah. 162 Other myths similarly link salvation with 
bodily and cosmic health. 163 
The correspondence between grace and health on the one hand and 
between sin and illness on the other runs throughout Western history. 
In the Middle Ages, health represented the certainty of grace while 
illness was thought to be a punishment or ordeal. 164 Later, poor teeth 
were thought to be a sign of sexual guilt. 165 In the last century, 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 182-83. 
160. See WALZER, supra note 11, at 90. 
161. Paul Tillich, The Relation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations 
and Theoretical Questions, in THE MEANING OF HEALITH 16, 17 (Perry Lefevre ed., 
1984). 
162. Id. at 19; Matthew 11 :5. 
163. Tillich, supra note 161, at 18-19. 
164. Labisch, supra note 139, at 86; Patrick Gallacher, The Summoner's Tale and 
Medieval Attitudes Towards Sickness, 21 CHAUCER REV. 200, 208 (1986). 
165. David Kunzie, The Art of Pulling Teeth in the Seventeenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries: From Public Martyrdom to Private Nightmare and Political Struggle, in 3 
FRAGMENTS, supra note 88, at 28, 29. 
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masturbation was both a sin and a cause of disease. 166 In literature, 
Dorian Gray's numerous sins marked his portrait as sores and scars. 167 
Many modem religious sects rely on their own understanding of health 
to both differentiate themselves from the rest of society and to exert 
control over their membership. 168 Alternatively, individuals have 
turned to an eclectic mixture of health and religious practices, such as 
meditation, healing circles, and Western occult traditions, in an effort to 
reconnect their minds, bodies, and spirits. 169 Rather than view one's 
health as the purely technical problem of identifying certain conditions 
and administering certain medicines, these individuals see a link between 
physical health, emotional health, spiritual health, and well-being that 
modem medicine seems to ignore. 170 This view is supported by the 
feeling that physicians treat patients as objects171 with no say in their 
medical treatment and that physicians look too narrowly at the body for 
the sources of illness. 172 
Despite the obvious links between the human body and human health, 
each reflects its own distinct set of values. While the body reflects the 
values of identity, community, sharing, and sin, human health is 
connected to the values of individual responsibility and political and 
moral control. Many of the issues involved in the question of the 
ownership of human biological materials implicate both sets of values. 
Thus, whenever we make determinations about these materials, whether 
we are conscious of it or not, we decide which of these values to further 
and which to ignore. 
III. MOORE: THE PATIENT'S BODY 
While there have been relatively few court decisions touching on the 
admixture of property law and the human body, one case, Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California, 173 provides a vehicle to discuss 
166. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
167. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DoRIAN GRAY {Modern Library, 1992) 
(1895). 
168. See McGuire, supra note 155, at 151-52. 
169. See id at 145, 148-49. 
170. See id at 154. 
171. FREUND & McGUIRE, supra note 142, at 217. 
172. Id at 6-7. 
173. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 936 (1991). The facts as outlined in the text are set out in Moore. Id at 125-28, 
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the effect of using property law to regulate biotechnological research in 
the human body. In 1976, John Moore sought treatment at the Medical 
Center of the University of California, Los Angeles, for hairy-cell 
leukemia, a rare disease. Dr. David Golde, the attending physician, 
confirmed the diagnosis and recommended that Moore's spleen be 
removed. Moore consented to the splenectomy, which was subsequently 
performed. On several occasions over the next seven years, at Golde's 
direction, Moore returned to the medical center. 174 During these visits, 
Golde withdrew samples of Moore's blood, skin, bone marrow, and 
sperm. Golde told Moore that these samples were required to monitor 
and ensure Moore's continued health. 
Soon after his first encounters with Moore, however, Golde recognized 
that Moore's body was overproducing certain important components of 
the human immune system, known as lymphokines. Golde perceived 
that the overproduction of these typically scarce substances made their 
isolation possible. Moore's cells, he realized, could be used as factories 
to produce lymphokines in large quantities, offering the opportunity for 
commercial exploitation. 175 In order to capitalize on this idea, Golde 
arranged before the splenectomy to have portions of Moore's spleen 
retained for research. Golde used this spleen tissue and the additional 
bodily substances collected from Moore during his subsequent visits to 
the medical center to create a culture of cells producing lymphokines. 
This "cell-line" differed from Moore's ordinary cells only in that, 
through a well-known but sometimes difficult process, 176 the cells in 
the cell-line were enabled to reproduce themselves indefinitely. 
Realizing the enormous commercial potential of the cell-line and its 
derived products-estimated to be approximately three billion dol-
lars177-Golde and his research assistant, Shirley Quan, entered into 
contracts with several pharmaceutical companies and the University of 
California to commercially develop the cell-line. Pursuant to these 
contracts, Golde received a substantial number of shares in one of the 
companies and both Golde and the university were generously paid. 
Golde and Quan applied for and obtained a patent in the cell-line and its 
derived products which they assigned to the university. 
793 P.2d at 480-83, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147-50. 
174. Moore did so at his own expense. 
175. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, supra note 3, at 35. 
176. Id at 32-34. 
177. This estimate, based on the value of the cell-line and other products to the year 
1990, was provided by Moore in his complaint. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127, 793 P.2d at 
482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149. 
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Golde never informed Moore that the spleen and other cells were 
commercially valuable nor that Golde intended to exploit this value for 
himself. When Moore discovered Golde's activity, he brought suit 
claiming that Golde, Quan, the university, and the pharmaceutical 
companies had converted his cells and ought to disgorge the profit made 
from the cell-line. Moore's claim was rejected on a preliminary motion 
at trial. On appeal, however, the California Court of Appeal found that 
Moore had retained a proprietary interest in his cells and that Moore was 
entitled to compensation for conversion if he could prove his claims at 
trial. 178 On further appeal, the Supreme Court of California found that 
Moore had no proprietary interest in his removed cells and thus could 
not sustain his action for conversion. 179 The court nevertheless held 
that Moore was entitled to compensation if he could prove that Golde 
had breached his fiduciary obligations to Moore by failing to inform 
Moore, prior to the splenectomy and the other medical procedures, of 
Golde's commercial interest in his cells. 180 
Two property claims were in conflict in Moore. While academic 
commentators have concentrated exclusively on Moore's claim to 
ownership of his spleen and other bodily cells, 181 the scope of Golde's 
178. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988). 
179. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 134-47, 793 P.2d at 487-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154-64. 
180. Id at 128-34, 793 P.2d at 483-87, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150-54. 
181. There have been a plethora of academic articles discussing Moore and the 
issues it raises. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Oct. 1986, at 28 (arguing that patients ought to have property rights in their body 
tissues in order to control their body); Michelle B. Bray, Note, PersonalizingPersonalty: 
Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990) (supporting the 
grant of an inalienable property right to patients in their bodies so as to further patients' 
sense of identity); Mary T. Danforth, Cells, Sales and Royalties: The Patient's Right to 
a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 179 (1988) (proposing a licensing 
system to allow patients to financially participate in the commercial exploitation of their 
tissues); Maureen S. Dorney, Moore v. The Regents of the University of California: 
Balancing the Need for Biotechnology Innovation Against the Right of Informed Consent, 
5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 333 (1990) (arguing that a patient's interest in protecting her 
autonomy can be protected without stifling scientific research on human tissues by 
according patients a strong right to be fully informed of the potential commercial uses 
of tissue before any medical procedure is undertaken); Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward 
the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of 
Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1986) (contending that patients ought to be 
accorded a right to profit from the commercial use of their tissues but ought not to be 
granted an absolute right of possession of their tissues); Christopher Heyer, Comment, 
Moore v. Regents of University of California: The Right of Property in Human Tissue 
and Its Effect on Medical Research, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 629 (1990) 
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property claim to these cells was also in issue. Given that the California 
Supreme Court declined to recognize Moore's property interest in the 
cells, Golde was left with plenary authority, within the bounds of health 
and safety regulations and patent law, to control and profit from them. 
Since the property interests of both Moore and Golde were fundamental-
ly connected to one another, in analyzing Moore it is wise to keep in 
mind both the nature of Moore's claim to his own bodily tissues and the 
nature of Golde's claim over the cells and related biological materials. 
The Moore court spoke through four separate opinions, two declining 
to recognize Moore's property right and two recognizing such a right. 
Each opinion reveals a different understanding of property law and of 
its application to the human body. These understandings emerge from 
the opinions indirectly, as the sum of each writer's bold strokes and 
small flourishes, rather than through direct presentations. In this Part, 
these different understandings and what they reveal about the nature of 
property discourse are explored, as well as the likely impact of this 
discourse on the human body. 
A. The Majority: Property as Enhancing Trade 
The majority of the court in Moore valued Moore's cells and tissues 
in terms of market value. The majority's primary concern in dealing 
with Moore's conversion claim was the effect that a decision in favor of 
Moore would likely have on research and development in pharmaceutical 
(claiming that it is inappropriate to create a property right in one's bodily tissue when 
the human persona can be protected by the right of privacy); Laura M. Ivey, Note, 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Insufficient Protection of Patients' 
Rights in the Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REV. 489 (1991) (asserting that 
patients ought to be granted property rights in their bodies in order to protect their 
autonomy); Aaron C. Lichtman, Note, Commercial Exploitation of DNA and the Tort of 
Conversion: A Physician May Not Destroy a Patient's Interest in Her Body-Matter, 34 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 531 (1989) (arguing that, in order to control the use to which one's 
body is put, patients ought to be accorded a property right in their bodies); Patricia A. 
Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of Human Cells: 
Toward an Organic View of Life and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 211 (1989) (contending that the recognition of a property right in one's 
tissues carries the connotation that tissue is a commodity); Randy W. Marusyk & 
Margaret S. Swain, Comment, A Question of Property Rights in the Human Body, 21 
OTTAWA L. REV. 351 (1989) (claiming that the commercial sale of human tissue is not 
compatible with society's moral and ethical standards for the treatment of the human 
body); Patricia M. Parker, Comment, Recognizing Property Interests in Bodily Tissues: 
A Need for Legislative Guidance, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 357 (1989) (advocating the 
enactment oflegislation to protect a patient's interests in the monetary benefits derived 
by hospitals and researchers from the patient's unique tissues); RUSSELL SCOTT, THE 
BODY AS PROPERTY ( 1981) ( concluding that donors of tissue should only be compensat-
ed for expenses and not for tissue itself). 
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products. 182 Granting Moore a property right in his own tissues, the 
majority held, would impede future research and development using 
human biological materials. 183 Every researcher into whose hands a 
patient's tissue passed would be liable for conversion unless the patient 
had previously agreed to sell the tissue. Researchers would be unwilling 
to use tissues collected by others because of uncertainty over whether the 
donor of the tissue had adequately consented to the use of the tissue for 
research and commercial development. Such tissues would amount to 
"a ticket in a litigation lottery."184 Similarly, '"companies [would be] 
unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a 
product when uncertainty about clear title exists. "'185 Therefore, held 
the majority, the grant of a property right to Moore in his own tissues 
would hinder the free exchange of human biological materials and 
would, ultimately, lead to a reduction in the production of pharmaceuti-
cal products. 186 Since the allocation of a property right to Moore in 
his tissues would hinder trade in such tissues, the majority concluded 
that Moore ought not to be granted such a right. 187 On the other hand, 
because trade is enhanced by granting researchers and pharmaceutical 
companies property rights to human biological material, this encourages 
heavy investment in the development and production of new drugs that 
will be traded on the market. Thus, property rights ought to be granted 
to such researchers and pharmaceutical companies. 
182. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143-47, 793 P.2d at 493-96, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-63. 
183. Id. at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161. 
184. Id. at 146, 793 P.2d at 495-96, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63 (Panelli, J.). 
185. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-
BA-337, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES 
AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT 27 (1987)). 
186. Id. at 144-45, 793 P.2d at 494-95, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62. In reaching this 
conclusion, the majority referred to some of the anticipated negative effects of holding 
that patients have a property right in their tissues: 
The extension of conversion Jaw into this area will hinder research by 
restricting access to the necessary raw materials. Thousands of human cell 
lines already exist in tissue repositories . . . . These repositories respond to 
tens of thousands ofrequests for samples annually .... At present, human cell 
lines are routinely copied and distributed to other researchers for experimental 
purposes, usually free of charge. This exchange of scientific materials, which 
still is relatively free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell 
sample becomes the potential subject matter of a lawsuit. 
Id. ( citations and footnotes omitted). 
187. Id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164. 
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Although the majority did not consider non-market values in its 
rejection of Moore's property claims, it did not ignore such values or 
treat them as insignificant; rather, the majority recognized that the 
human body is valuable in ways beyond its market price. 188 In fact, 
in order to address the body's importance to individual autonomy, the 
majority extended the law of informed consent to require physicians 
such as Golde to inform their patients of any commercial interest they 
may have in their patients' tissues. When deliberating over whether to 
undergo the splenectomy, the majority held, Moore should have 
possessed information not only pertaining to the benefits and dangers of 
the operation itself, but also to the quality of the advice Golde was 
providing to him. The majority sought to guarantee the latter type of 
information by requiring physicians to inform patients of factors, such 
as outside commercial interests, that a patient may reasonably believe to 
have influenced the physician's recommendations. 189 
It is notable, however, that the majority was unwilling to go beyond 
its extension of the law of informed consent and invoke the law of 
property to protect Moore's autonomy. 190 This unwillingness prevailed 
despite the fact that the informed consent remedy is less effective in 
reaching the goal of autonomy than would be a property right. A patient 
facing serious illness is unlikely to withhold consent to a necessary 
medical procedure simply because an attending physician discloses a 
commercial interest in the patient's tissues. The physician, not the 
patient, possesses the expert knowledge required to determine treat-
ment. 191 The patient is, therefore, in no position either to second-guess 
the physician's recommendations or to determine whether the physician's 
commercial interests played a role in the formulation of these recom-
mendations. 
188. See id. at 140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158. 
189. Id. at 130, 133, 793 P.2d at 483, 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151, 153. 
190. Id. at 140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158. The majority stated that 
other ways of valuing the body ought to be protected outside the law of property, for 
example, by the law of informed consent: 
Id. 
Yet one may earnestly wish to protect privacy and dignity without accepting 
the extremely problematic conclusion that interference with those interests 
amounts to a conversion of personal property. Nor is it necessary to force the 
round pegs of "privacy" and "dignity" into the square hole of "property" in 
order to protect the patient, since the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent 
theories protect these interests directly by requiring full disclosure. 
191. See EVANS, supra note 10, at 71-73; G.M. Ginsberg, Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Value of Life in Health Care and Prevention, in 
COSTS AND BENEFITS IN HEALTH CARE AND PREVENTION: AN INIBRNATIONAL 
APPROACH TO PRIORITIES IN MEDICINE 6, 6-7 (U. Laaser et al. eds., 1990). 
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Thus, the requirement that physicians inform patients of potentially 
conflicting interests provides little check on the influence that these 
interests have on physicians' recommendations and only minimally 
enhances patients' ability to make autonomous medical decisions. On 
the other hand, a property right in tissue could be formulated to reduce 
the likelihood that a physician would be influenced by his or her 
commercial interests in a patient's tissue. Because a physician would 
have to bargain with a patient for commercial rights to tissue after the 
completion of medical treatment, the physician is less likely to be 
influenced by commercial considerations when formulating and 
recommending such treatment. Further, if patients retained property 
rights in their tissues following surgical removal, patients would retain 
the right to dispose of their tissues following the successful completion 
of their treatment. At this time, the patient would be in a significantly 
better position to evaluate whether to consent to the commercial use of 
his or her tissues. The patient's position would have improved both 
because the patient would be less dependent on the physician's ability 
to treat the patient's illness and because the patient would no longer be 
living under the cloud of his or her illness. 
B. Justice Broussard: Human Biological Materials Are Already 
Property 
Justice Broussard, in his dissent, accepted the majority's equation of
property rights with the enhancement of trade in market goods. He 
argued, however, that human biological materials are, for better or 
worse, market goods. 192 Physicians, researchers, and pharmaceutical 
companies exchange such materials, increasingly for a fee, and apply for 
and receive patents for such materials as they would for any market 
good. Justice Broussard stated that given that human biological 
192. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 160, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Broussard, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Broussard stated, "[T]he majority's 
rejection of plaintiff's conversion cause of action does not mean that body parts may not 
be bought or sold for research or commercial purposes or that no private individual or 
entity may benefit economically from the fortuitous value of plaintiffs diseased cells." 
Id. 
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materials are already traded on the market, there is no reason not to 
recognize the patient's economic interest in such material. 193 
Jusice Broussard stated that a property right could be fashioned to 
allow patients such as Moore to participate in the economic value of 
their tissues without impeding research and development leading to new 
pharmaceutical products. He proposed that, where a physician fails to 
adequately inform a patient of the physician's commercial interest in the 
patient's tissue prior to the removal of that tissue, not only should the 
physician be held liable for failing to fully inform the patient under the 
law of informed consent, but the physician, lacking consent for the 
commercial use of the tissue, should also be held liable in conversion for 
any profit derived therefrom. 194 Patients, under this proposal, have a 
property right in their tissues prior to their removal. Where a physician 
removes tissue surreptitiously, knowing of its commercial value, the 
physician must disgorge any profits made. Since, as Justice Broussard 
pointed out, it is only in the rare case that a physician knows beforehand 
that tissue can be commercially exploited, 195 this proposal does not 
jeopardize continued research using human biological materials. Tissue 
that is currently in wide circulation is unlikely to have been removed 
with the knowledge that it was commercially valuable and thus 
researchers, Justice Broussard continued, can freely use human biological 
materials without fear of being sued. 196 In addition, even if a pharma-
ceutical company finds that it has inadvertently profited from material 
gathered by a physician who had failed to disclose a known commercial 
interest in that material, damages are likely to be limited. Since the 
most economically valuable part of a pharmaceutical product is derived 
from the work of the researcher and is not inherent in the material itself, 
pharmaceutical companies will not likely face large damage awards and 
thus will not be deterred from the development of new pharmaceutical 
193. Id at 159, 793 P.2d at 505,271 Cal. Rptr. at 172. Justice Broussard criticized 
the majority for failing to address patients' interests in such material. He stated, "[T]he 
opinion speaks only of the 'patient's right to make autonomous medical decisions' and 
fails even to mention the patient's interest in obtaining the economic value, if any, that 
may adhere in the subsequent use of his own body parts." Id (citations omitted). 
194. Id at 154-55, 793 P.2d at 501-02, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69. 
195. Id at 150-51, 793 P.2d at 498-99, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66. 
I 96. Id at 158, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171. Justice Broussard pointed 
to the safety, from a legal point of view, of using tissues in a tissue bank: 
Id. 
In the vast majority of instances the tissues and cells in existing repositories 
will not represent a potential source of liability because they will have come 
from patients who consented to their organ's use for scientific purposes under 
circumstances in which such consent was not tainted by a failure to disclose 
the known valuable nature of the cells. 
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products. 197 In formulating such a property right, Justice Broussard 
strongly countered the majority's principal argument that granting Moore 
a property right in his own tissues would impede the future development 
and trade in pharmaceutical products. 
The majority's contention that human biological materials are not 
property, Justice Broussard next argued, is simply false. Even though 
the majority did not recognize Moore's property interest in his own 
tissue, the majority recognized that Golde and the pharmaceutical 
companies possessed a property right to the biological material. 198 In 
effect, Justice Broussard wrote, the majority simply transferred Moore's 
property right in his tissue, including the right to profit therefrom, to 
Golde and the pharmaceutical companies: 
[T]he majority's holding simply bars plaintiff, the source of the cells, from 
obtaining the benefit of the cells' value, but permits defendants, who allegedly 
obtained the cells from plaintiff by improper means, to retain and exploit the 
full economic value of their ill-gotten gains free of their ordinary common law 
liability for conversion.199 
While the market price of a patient's tissues may be a windfall to that 
patient, just as the market price of oil discovered on a piece of real 
property is a windfall to the land owner, Justice Broussard argued that 
this windfall was no reason not to allow the patient to retain this price 
and certainly no justification for rewarding those who misappropriate 
this price. 200 
The disagreement between the majority and Justice Broussard centered 
around how best to promote trade in biological materials and new 
pharmaceutical products. As discussed above, Justice Broussard 
carefully addressed the majority's concern that trade would be under-
mined if Moore were granted a property right in his own tissue. He 
created a narrow property right unlikely to stunt future research and 
development. While the majority obfuscated the question of whether 
human biological materials are property, Justice Broussard clearly 
197. Id. at 159, 793 P.2d at 505,271 Cal. Rptr. at 172. 
198. Id. at 153-54, 793 P.2d at 501,271 Cal. Rptr. at 168. Justice Broussard stated, 
"Thus, the majority's analysis cannot rest on the broad proposition that a removed body 
part is not property, but rather rests on the proposition that a patient retains no 
ownership interest in a body part once the body part has been removed from his or her 
body." Id. 
199. Id. at 160, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173. 
200. Id. at 159, 793 P.2d at 505, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 172. 
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accepted that, whether the courts like it or not, the pharmaceutical 
industry already treats such materials as market goods. The central 
question was, he reasoned, not whether human biological materials ought 
to be property but who should be permitted to hold such property. 
There was no justification, he concluded, to exclude individuals such as 
Moore from participating in this extant market. To this the majority 
appears to have no answer. 
The agreement between the majority and Justice Broussard is as 
significant, however, as their disagreement. Both analyzed the question 
of whether the court ought to grant Moore a property right in his own 
tissue in terms of the effect such a decision was likely to have on the 
markets in human biological materials and pharmaceutical products.201 
Both accepted that functioning markets were the goal of their delibera-
tions. Both agreed that the effect the decision was likely to have on 
various factors-such as the safety of biomedical research, the physician-
patient relationship, and the self-development of individuals-need not 
be explicitly addressed. The majority justified this position on the 
assumption that the market neutrally sorts out these factors. Underlying 
this assumption seems to be the belief that, to the extent that any explicit 
discussion of these factors is warranted, it should be undertaken as part 
of a larger discussion of the law of informed consent.202 Justice 
Broussard may not have believed that the market was up to the task of 
weighing all factors but, nevertheless, he accepted that it was not the 
court's role, in property law decisions, to deal with these factors. 203 
The two remaining opinions in Moore diverged significantly from the 
points on which the majority and Justice Broussard agreed. Fundamen-
tally, both of these remaining opinions rejected the premise that property 
rights in human biological materials ought to depend on the effect such 
rights are likely to have on the market.204 Both embraced the view 
201. See supra notes 182-87, 192-97 and accompanying text. 
202. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 147, 793 P.2d at 496-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64 
(Panelli, J.). 
Id. 
203. Id. at 159-60, 793 P.2d at 505,271 Cal. Rptr. at 172. Justice Broussard stated: 
It is certainly arguable that, as a matter of policy or morality, it would be 
wiser to prohibit any private individual or entity from profiting from the 
fortuitous value that adheres in a part of a human body, and instead to require 
all valuable excised body parts to be deposited in a public repository which 
would make such materials freely available to all scientists for the betterment 
of society as a whole. The Legislature, if it wished, could create such a 
system, as it has done with respect to organs that are donated for transplanta-
tion. To date, however, the Legislature has not adopted such a system for 
organs that are to be used for research or commercial purposes . . . . 
204. See discussion infra Parts III.C-D. 
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that the human body and body tissues are valuable in ways beyond their 
market price and that such non-market values cannot be translated into 
such a price.205 Last, both agreed that an appropriate analysis of the 
property law question in Moore must contend with these other values 
openly-that is, without assuming that the market will balance such 
values neutrally and invisibly.206 
C. Justice Mask: Property as a Plurality of Values 
Justice Mask, in dissent, sought to bring all the divergent ways of 
valuing the human body and human biological materials within the scope 
of property law. He rejected the majority's and Justice Broussard's 
position that property discourse ought to be expressed in the language 
of trade. Specifically, he argued that courts ought not to grant or 
withhold property rights solely on the basis of market considerations; 
rather, they ought to ground such determinations on a host of values, 
many of which will have no market price. Only by incorporating all 
values within its property analysis, Justice Mask stated, can the court 
hope to arrive at a decision that is both equitable and moral. Therefore, 
in his discussion of the property law issue in Moore, Justice Mask 
emphasized the need to recognize patients' inherent dignity and equalize 
the relationship between physician and patient. 207 
Centrally, Justice Mask contended that patients must be granted a 
property right in their own tissues if they are to maintain sufficient 
control over their bodies and themselves to accord with the requirements 
of human dignity.208 The majority's opinion, in narrowly focusing on 
market effects, failed, according to Justice Mask, to address this most 
important of all values. Justice Mask also took the majority to task for 
attempting to take refuge in an informed consent analysis. While Justice 
Mask accepted this analysis as far as it went, 209 he challenged the 
205. See discussion infra Parts III.C-D. 
206. See discussion infra Parts III.C-D. 
207. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 173-77, 793 P.2d at 515-18, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 182-85 
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk identified two non-economic values implicated in 
the decision whether to grant Moore a property right in his own tissues. Justice Mosk 
believed these two values-dignity and equity-trumped the majority's market concerns 
not because of their greater price, but because they exist outside of the market, on the 
moral plane. Id 
208. Id at 173-74, 793 P.2d at 515-16, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83. 
209. Id at 178, 793 P.2d at 519,271 Cal. Rptr. at 186. 
1211 
majority's sterilization of property discourse from any infecting moral 
and ethical claims. He criticized the majority for its failure to investi-
gate whether such claims could be better protected by a property right 
as opposed to a right of informed consent, 210 and opined that the 
majority's decision to reject Moore's property right actually undermined 
the ethical and moral values inhering in the human body and human 
biological materials.211 
D. Justice Arabian: Rejecting Property Discourse 
Justice Arabian agreed with Justice Mosk that the court ought to 
openly address far more than market effects when deciding whether to 
grant Moore a property right in his own tissue.212 He agreed that 
fundamental values were implicated in the Moore case: 
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one's own body 
tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel-the single most 
venerated and protected subject in any civilized society-as equal with the 
basest commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the 
profane. He asks much.213 
Unlike Justice Mosk, however, Justice Arabian did not believe that these 
non-market values could be incorporated within a property law analysis. 
He doubted both the institutional capacity of the court to discuss such 
values explicitly and the flexibility of property discourse to encompass 
such values. 
While Justice Arabian held that courts are institutionally incapable of 
balancing the myriad values involved in a case such as Moore,214 his 
recognition of this lack of competence did not imply that the court ought 
to entrust the market to balance such values. Instead of a judicial or 
market solution to the problem of balancing values, Justice Arabian 
210. Id at 178-82, 793 P.2d at 518-21, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 185-88. 
211. Id at 175, 793 P.2d at 516-17, 271 Cal. Rptr. 183-84. 
212. Id. at 148, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (Arabian, J., concurring). 
Justice Arabian stated, "I write separately to give voice to a concern that I believe 
informs much of [the majority] opinion but finds little or no expression therein. I speak 
of the moral issue." Id. 
213. Id 
214. Id. at 149, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165. Justice Arabian's 
uncertainty about judicial competence is expressed throughout his opinion. For example: 
It is true, that this court has not often been deterred from deciding difficult 
legal issues simply because they require a choice between competing social or 
economic policies. The difference here, however, lies in the nature of the 
conflicting moral, philosophical and even religious values at stake, and in the 
profound implications of the position urged. 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
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argued that the solution ought to be left to the legislature.215 Justice 
Arabian's approach contrasts strongly with the majority's view of 
judicial competence. The majority readily acknowledged that courts 
cannot explicitly weigh non-market values when allocating property 
rights; only the legislature is competent to do so.216 However, to the 
majority, this was no reason to refrain from allocating property rights. 
The majority suggested that although courts cannot explicitly weigh non-
market values in making their decisions, they can rely on the market to 
take such values into account by assigning such values a price.217 
Thus, the courts can do indirectly-and neutrally-what they cannot do 
directly.218 
215. Id at 149-50, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165. 
216. Id at 147, 793 P.2d at 496, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (Panelli, J.). The majority, 
however, did not contend that the legislature was better able to balance the myriad values 
at stake in Moore; rather, the majority argued that the legislature's superior access to 
empirical facts permitted the legislature to better evaluate the economic consequences of 
granting Moore a property right in his own tissue: 
If the scientific users of human cells are to be held liable for failing to 
investigate the consensual pedigree of their raw materials, we believe the 
Legislature should make that decision. Complex policy choices affecting all 
society are involved, and "[l]egislatures, in making such policy decisions, have 
the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold 
hearings at which all interested parties present evidence and express their 
views .... " Legislative competence to act in this area is demonstrated by the 
existing statutes governing the use and disposition of human biological 
materials. Legislative interest is demonstrated by the extensive study recently 
commissioned by the United States Congress. Commentators are also 
recommending legislative solutions. 
Id ( citations omitted). 
217. This is the import of the majority's decision to withhold property rights based 
solely on economic factors. 
218. It should be noted that Justice Broussard's position on judicial competence is 
more ambiguous than that of the majority. He argued that the legislature may be better 
able than the courts to balance the values inhering in human biological materials: 
It is certainly arguable that, as a matter of policy or morality, it would be 
wiser to prohibit any private individual or entity from profiting from the 
fortuitous value that adheres in a part of a human body, and instead to require 
all valuable excised body parts to be deposited in a public repository which 
would make such materials freely available to all scientists for the betterment 
of society as a whole. The Legislature, if it wished, could create such a 
system .... 
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 159, 793 P.2d at 505, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Broussard, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Nevertheless, Justice Broussard held that the court 
was competent to allocate property rights on the basis of market considerations. Justice 
Mosk found that there was no competency problem involved in Moore: 
1213 
Fundamentally, Justice Arabian believed that if the courts considered 
human biological materials to be property, the law would come to "treat 
human tissue as a fungible article of commerce,"219 leading him to fear 
for "the effect on human dignity of a marketplace in human body 
parts."220 Stated briefly, Justice Arabian did not want human biologi-
cal products to become market goods. Treating such products as 
property, he feared, would subject them to a property analysis that treats 
all goods as market goods. In contradistinction to Justice Mosk, Justice 
Arabian did not believe that property discourse could encompass values 
beyond market values. Not only did he believe the judiciary incompe-
tent to balance these values, he believed the history of property discourse 
in the courts was premised on the belief that the market neutrally 
balanced such values without the need for explicit consideration.221 
This belief, which he did not accept, denies the need to expand property 
discourse to allow for an explicit discussion of non-market values. Until 
property discourse abandons its reliance on the market to maximize 
value, it will remain inhospitable to those arguing that property rights 
ought to be allocated on some basis other than market values. Doubting 
the market's ability to encompass all values and accepting that property 
discourse, as carried out in the courtroom, limits discussion to market 
considerations, Justice Arabian forsook this discourse in order to protect 
non-market ways of valuing the human body. This was the only way to 
My point is that if the cause of action for conversion is otherwise an 
appropriate remedy on these facts, we should not refrain from fashioning it 
simply because another court has not yet so held or because the Legislature has 
not yet addressed the question. We need not wait on either event, because 
neither is a precondition to an exercise of our long-standing "power to insure 
the just and rational development of the common law in our state." 
Id at 163, 793 P.2d at 507-08, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 394, 525 P.2d 669, 676, 115 Cal. 
Rptr. 765, 772 (1974)). 
219. Id at 149, 793 P.2d at 497-98, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65 (Arabian, J., 
concurring). 
220. Id at 149, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165. 
221. Id Justice Arabian's concern about judicial competency plays an important 
role in his belief that property discourse, as carried out in the courts, cannot accommo-
date non-market values: 
Id 
Does it uplift or degrade the "unique human persona" to treat human tissue as 
a fungible-article of commerce? Would it advance or impede the human 
condition, spiritually or scientifically, by delivering the majestic force of the 
law behind plaintiffs claim? I do not know the answers to these troubling 
questions, nor am I willing-like Justice Mosk-to treat them simply as issues 
of "tort" law, susceptible of judicial resolution. 
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deal, he concluded, with a "question [that] implicates choices which not 
only reflect, but which ultimately define our essence."222 
IV. ARE VALUES COMMENSURABLE? 
The cases discussed in this Article, in particular the decision of the 
majority in Moore, support the conclusion that in the analysis of 
property law claims centering on the human body, courts focus their 
inquiry on the question of whether granting property rights in the body 
or body parts furthers trade in the body and its parts. Conversely, the 
courts do not examine whether the non-economic values inhering in the 
human body and in human health are harmed or furthered through the 
allocation of property rights. The courts leave the furtherance of these 
values and the continued development of the social meaning of the body 
and health to the action of the market. They do so on the implicit 
assumption that the market appropriately measures and compares the 
various, often competing, values inhering in goods. 
If the assumption that the market will appropriately weigh and 
compare values is correct, it is logical for the courts to place goods into 
the market. Instead of trying to accomplish the seemingly impossible 
task of considering all values and how their decisions will affect those 
values, the courts have only to tum over this task to the market, which 
is, because of its vastness and its ability to reflect everyone's tastes, in 
a much better position to undertake this task than the courts. This logic 
is based, however, on the assumption that the market can and does 
measure and compare values. This assumption, in tum, has two 
elements: first, that there exists some scale into which every value 
inhering in a good can be translated; and second, that this scale is 
money. 
Given the courts' belief that money (the market value) is the value 
into which all others can be translated, it would be sufficient to 
undermine the analysis in decisions such as U.S. Steel and Moore if one 
were to convincingly show that a super-scale based on money or market 
value ignores many of the things we value about goods. Such a rebuttal, 
would not, however, end matters because it would leave open the 
possibility that other super-scales of value exist and that all one must do 
to meet the concerns expressed in this Article would be to find a better 
222. Id 
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super-scale than one based on market values. For this reason, it is 
argued that a common super-scale of value does not exist. 
The issue of ranking values on a common scale comes to the fore 
most strongly where there are apparently conflicting values. Consider, 
for example, the disparate claims of scientific investigation and religious 
belief on the body. The body, from a scientific viewpoint, is a source 
of knowledge of physical development, aging, and disease. From a 
religious perspective, the body is understood as a sacred object, created 
in the image of God. The scientist values the body instrumentally, as a 
means to acquire knowledge; the believer values the body intrinsically, 
as an image of God. Within the framework of understanding of the 
scientist and the believer, the body is valued in an appropriate manner. 
It is only when the frameworks of scientist and believer make disparate 
claims upon the body that a conflict arises. Such a conflict could occur 
if, for. example, the scientist wishes to perform an autopsy which the 
believer feels is a violation of the body's sacred nature. 
If it were either true that the understanding of the scientist could be 
translated into the language of the believer ( or vice versa), or true that 
both the language of the scientist and that of the believer could be 
translated into a meta-language, then the apparent conflict between 
scientist and believer could be resolved. In other words, if the values of 
scientist and of believer are commensurable-that is, can be ranked on 
a single common scale of value-the conflict would turn out to be more 
apparent than real. While disputes would not be eliminated, since people 
will continue to have imperfect understanding based on incomplete 
information, they would, in principle, be resolvable. 
To help understand, by analogy, the claim that values are commensu-
rable, consider the following interpretation of color perception.223 
Normal human color vision is based on red, green, and blue light.224 
That is, cone cells in our eyes are activated by either red, green, or blue 
light. Imagine looking at an object that causes our red, green, and blue 
cones to fire in a certain proportion (B units of red, D units of green, 
and F units of blue in Figure 1 ). Our brains register these various units 
of red, green, and blue, and determine that the object is a certain color 
(point Hin Figure 1). Call this last color simply "color." 
223. This example is chosen purposely. While most people take color perception 
for granted, it is far from straightforward. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 98, at 369-97. 
224. Id at 377. 
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D GREEN 
With this example in mind, we may ask whether colors are commen-
surable. That is, can the colors of different objects be placed upon a 
common scale and ranked? It must first be noted that one cannot simply 
compare measurements of red, green, and blue on a common scale. If 
we could, then B units of red, D units of green, and F units of blue 
would equal D units of red, F units of green, and B units of blue, which 
they clearly do not. (This would be equivalent to saying that a certain 
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hue of brown is equal to a certain hue of purple.) Such a statement is 
meaningless since no one with color vision could make sense of it. 
One can nonetheless attempt to establish a common measure for color 
in various ways. First, one can take one of the three sense perceptions 
that go into the determination of color-that is, either the firing of red, 
green, or blue cones in the eyes-to be the one really authentic 
perception of color and then compare colors based on that perception. 
That is, one can reduce color determination to one common factor, say 
green, and simply determine whether a particular color is more or less 
green than another. If one wants to maximize color, one can simply 
choose the most "green" object (the one that has the most units of green 
in it). In Figure 1, for example, the color corresponding to point H has 
D units of green. 
While reducing color to the firing of green cones has the advantage of 
ranking colors on a common scale, it does so at the loss of much that is 
interesting about color: the redness, blueness, and the combination red-
blueness. Some of this richness can be restored if we measure all color 
in terms of, for example, red-greenness (point C in Figure 1 ). This, 
however, not only fails to capture all there is about color, specifically its 
blueness, but does not even provide a meaningful standard against which 
to measure color. While we do know B units of red and D units of 
green are greater than B units of red by itself, are they equal, greater, or 
less than D units of red and B units of green? 
A more propitious tack would be to find a common scale outside of 
the firings of red, green, or blue cones in the eye. For example, one can 
simply calculate the length of the line AH in Figure 1. This length can 
be measured against the length of any other color to determine whether 
one color is greater, equal, or less than the other. Since the length of 
AH depends on all cone firings, and not simply on one type, it captures 
the richness of color. Notice, however, that the scale on which the 
length AH-call this the color super-scale-is measured has no 
counterpart in the world. That is, nowhere in the process of determining 
color does the length AH figure: the brain determines color from the 
raw data of red, green, and blue cone firings, without ever calculating 
the length AH. Thus, while the measurement of the line AH captures 
some of the complexity of color, it does not, in any meaningful way, 
correspond to the sensory perception of color. The ranking of one color 
ahead of another based on the measurement AH is an artifice that, while 
1218 
[VOL. 32: 1167, 1995] Owning Our Bodies 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
providing one way to talk about color, does not in any way correspond 
to the way we feel or think about color.225 
B. The Lack of a Meta-Scale 
The enterprise of attempting to rank color on some meta-scale, such 
as the measurement of the line AH, is a hopeless one. The determina-
tion of the color of an object depends not on the number of red, green, 
and blue cone firings occurring in the eye, but on the surface properties 
of the object, general lighting conditions, and the color of nearby 
objects.226 Painters have long known that altering the juxtaposition of 
pigments on a canvas changes one's determination of what colors one 
sees. Photographers constantly deal with problems associated with 
lighting conditions. When a photograph is taken in sunlight, an object 
has a different color on the resulting negative than when it is photo-
graphed under incandescent lighting. The photographer compensates for 
this effect by selecting film that is sensitive to the particular lighting 
conditions. The human determination of color, however, more or less 
compensates for this change in lighting. Colors appear more or less 
stable to us under differing light conditions.227 Thus, our brains use 
information not only from the firing cones but also from the surrounding 
environment to make color determinations. 
The appropriateness of a color also depends on the surrounding 
environment. Not only neighboring colors, but the size and purpose of 
the location in which the color appears help to determine whether it is 
suitable or not. Dark brown may be congenial in a bar, but it is 
awkward in an infant's nursery. A small patch of a bright color, say 
225. The color super-scale bears the same relationship to color as a meta-language 
of value bears to values. James Griffin suggested that "value" could be ranked on a 
scale of"well-being," which he argues makes values commensurable. JAMES GRIFFIN, 
WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 89-90 (1986). 
This is analogous to the claim that color can be ranked on a color super-scale. In neither 
case, as Griffin points out, is there any recourse to a "super-value." Id at 89. That is, 
the color super-scale and the scale of well-being do not measure substantive units of 
"color" or "well-being"; rather, the color super-scale ranks colors according to a 
particular and, as stated in the text, artificial conception of colorfulness while the scale 
of well-being ranks values according to their contribution to a particular notion of well-
being. 
226. See DENNETT, supra note 98, at 375. 
227. Our determination of color is not perfect, however. That is why we often take 
objects, particularly clothing, into sunlight to determine their "real" color. 
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pink, may liven up a room which would be made unbearable if the 
entire room were painted in that color. Sometimes, a color is appropri-
ate not because a better color cannot be found, but because it is neutral. 
For example, a room may look best painted fuchsia-in terms of giving 
the feeling of space, warmth, light, and comfort, but we may neverthe-
less paint the room white because white is more in keeping with cultural 
norms. As long as white is appropriate, it can be chosen even though 
it is not the "best" color. 228 
Because of the complexity of the perception of color, there is no one 
scale of "colorfulness" on which to rank color; rather, in choosing color, 
whether for a room or a canvas, we use a combination of skill, cultural 
sensitivity, a sense of balance, and intuition. The length AH in Figure 
1, while perhaps useful in some contexts to help one make comparisons 
between colors, does not capture all that is important about color and 
thus fails to provide a reliable mechanism to help us choose which color 
is "best." 
For much the same reasons that a color super-scale cannot rank color, 
no value super-scale can rank values. As was true of one's choice of 
color, a choice of which value is most important at the moment depends 
on, among other things, skill, cultural sensitivity, a sense of balance, and 
intuition. We choose our friendships, actions, and words in the context 
of our existing understanding of the world and in terms of the under-
standing we hope to achieve in the future.229 That is, we choose not 
only to satisfy what we currently desire but in order to become what we 
wish to become.230 We study not necessarily for immediate pleasure 
but in order to become the type of person we hope to be. We care for 
our friends not only because they bring us immediate pleasure but 
because we want to be the type of person who values friendship. We 
may even choose to sacrifice our happiness or well-being in order to be 
someone that we hold in high regard:231 we may give up our lives for 
a cause or for our people.232 
Consider for example, an individual, Gillian, choosing between 
returning to school to develop new skills in the hopes of finding a more 
fulfilling job and remaining in an unenjoyable, yet emotionally and 
financially stable job. The values militating in favor of returning to 
228. See MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 198 (1990). 
229. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 6 (1993); see 
also ROBIN HAHNEL & MICHAEL ALBERT, QUIET REVOLUTION IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 
75-109 (1990); TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 46-52. 
230. ANDERSON, supra note 229, at 6. 
231. Id at 60. 
232. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GoODNESS: LUCK AND 
ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 295 (1986). 
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school are self-development, autonomy, and adventure and those against 
are stability, financial autonomy, and security. If there is a super-scale 
of value, for example Griffin's scale of well-being,233 Gillian would 
be able to translate each of the above values into some quotient of well-
being and choose in accordance with the highest ranking value. Let us 
say that in the particular case, Gillian chooses to return to school 
because she believes herself to be capable of greater things than her 
current job seems to permit. In the instant case, she ranks self-
development ahead of stability and security on the super-scale of well-
being. 234 
While the above example seems to support the contention that there 
exists a super-scale on which one can rank values, when one examines 
Gillian's decision, one sees that the super-scale actually played no role 
in her decision nor does it provide a useful guide as to which decisions 
Gillian is likely to make in the future. 
The first thing to notice about Gillian's choice to go back to school is 
that she was only able to rank her values after she decided what she 
wanted to do. Intuitively, it is implausible to claim that, in her mental 
calculus, Gillian told herself that self-development would provide her 
with fifty points of well-being and that security would provide her with 
only thirty and that, therefore, she should choose the option that most 
furthers self-development. What is intuitively more plausible is that 
Gillian examined who she understood herself to be, what she wanted to 
become,235 and what her values were at that moment-in other words, 
in the context of her entire framework of understanding-and made her 
decision on the basis of which choice appeared to further the goals she 
then had.236 That is, Gillian only assigned points on the well-being 
scale after making her decision to go back to school; at that point, she 
understood herself to have ranked self-development ahead of security. 
The ranking of values on the scale of well-being was a result of Gillian 
having made her decision; it did not cause that decision to be made. 
One may argue, though, that the ranking exemplified by Gillian's 
choice may provide a basis upon which Gillian could rank values in the 
233. GRIFFIN, supra note 225, at 89. 
234. It is not clear where Gillian ranks autonomy since either choice implicates 
autonomy, albeit in different ways. 
235. ANDERSON, supra note 229, at 60. 
236. See TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 47; DENNETT, supra note 98, at 410; 
NUSSBAUM, supra note 232, at 306. 
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future. That is, Gillian's choice demonstrated her preferenc-
es-preferences that provide an understanding of which of Gillian's 
values are more important to her than others. However, preferences 
based on revealed choices-choices made in particular contexts with 
particular understandings-fail to capture the essence of what is 
valuable.237 Without the context and without the individual's under-
standing of the world, such revealed preferences tell us little about what 
is generally valuable; they only tell us what was valued in particular 
circumstances.238 One cannot extrapolate from such decisions to 
establish a value landscape. This is so because choices made need not 
be transitive-that is, simply because A was chosen over B and B was 
chosen over C does not imply that A would be chosen over C239-nor 
establish that what was chosen is better than that which was not.240 
Choices are made because they are thought to be good, not necessarily 
because they are thought to be better than the altematives.241 
The belief that values are commensurable, unless we are willing to 
accept a highly distorted view of values and of ourselves, is untenable. 
There is no reduction, whether to a single good, a single value, or to 
states of affairs, that can capture our understanding of the good. 242 It 
is not that commensurability offers an incomplete or unattainable 
deliberative process; it is that it offers merely a parody of such a 
process. In making choices, we constantly balance and enlarge our 
understanding of which goods are valuable and why they are so. Our 
languages and understanding of the world thus grow as individuals and 
societies attempt to balance the competing claims made upon them. 
C. Leaving Out Non-Market Values 
Consider once again the dispute between the scientist wishing to 
conduct an autopsy on a cadaver in order to further her research and a 
religious believer who believes that cutting open a dead body is 
immoral. Each of these individuals values the body in different ways: 
the scientist in terms of increasing knowledge and the believer in terms 
of spirituality. Consider, moreover, that the cadaver is subject to 
property rights. Between the scientist and the believer, then, how ought 
a court allocate such rights? The discourse applicable to this allocation 
is that of the market. According to market principles, one could argue 
237. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 325 (1986). 
238. ANDERSON, supra note 229, at 58, 70. 
239. Id at 51. 
240. RAz, supra note 237, at 339. 
241. Id.; see also STOCKER, supra note 228, at 198. 
242. ANDERSON, supra note 229, at 47. 
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that allocating property rights in the body to the scientist would 
encourage scientific research and, although not necessarily in the present 
case, increase the number of useful inventions made. These inventions 
would be traded on the market and increase well-being. Alternatively, 
one could argue that allocating property rights in the body to the 
scientist would stifle the research efforts of other researchers and thus 
discourage inventive activity overall. 
It is much harder, however, to put the believer's way of valuing the 
body, as sacred good, into the language of the market. One could try to 
argue that the believer would be likely to pay the most for the body in 
the market-in order to prevent autopsies-and, therefore, in order to 
save transaction costs we ought to allocate property rights in the cadaver 
to the believer. This argument fails, however, since we could not know 
a priori that the believer would, in fact, be willing to pay the most for 
the cadaver; only through the action of the market could this be 
established. 
The disparate values of the scientist and of the believer do not 
translate equally, therefore, into the language of the market. While the 
believer could argue against the allocation of property rights to the 
scientist on market grounds-the stifling effect of monopolies-the 
believer cannot argue against this allocation in terms of the values that 
the believer holds in the cadaver. The scientist's position is somewhat 
better. The scientist can rely on market arguments that reflect, at least 
in a significant way, the way the scientist values the cadaver: as a 
means of developing marketable inventions. But even some of the ways 
that the scientist values the cadaver may not be represented; for example, 
the scientist may value the cadaver for the pure joy of research or 
because the scientist is conducting the research out of respect for 
someone who died of the same disease as did the cadaver. These ways 
of valuing the body are not reflected in market discourse. 
D. The Lack of Commensurability and Human Biological Materials 
If, as argued above, values are not commensurable, then subjecting 
human biological materials to property discourse may lead to the 
allocation of control over these materials without reference to significant 
non-economic values inhering in them. Consider again the Moore case. 
As discussed, there were several values at stake in the Moore decision. 
These included not only the economic value of the cells in the cell-line, 
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but the values of dignity, autonomy, sharing, community, identity, and 
our understanding of health care. The majority in Moore based its 
decision on the perceived economic impact of its decision on research 
and development in the medical field. 243 It did not address,. for 
example, whether the gains made in health care by this research were 
proportionate to the alienation patients may feel from an ever-more 
technological and reductionalist approach to medicine.244 While the 
majority in Moore did discuss Moore's autonomy, it did so only in the 
context of the decision to receive medical care-through the law of 
informed consent-and not in the context of giving Moore the choice to 
be altruistic in dedicating the cells to the community. 
Golde's primary interest in Moore's spleen was a commercial one. 
This value easily translated into property discourse, premised as it was 
on market principles. On the other hand, the only one of Moore's 
values that translated into property discourse was his interest in receiving 
at least a share of the spleen's market value. While it is possible that 
this truly was the only interest that Moore had in his spleen, it seems 
more plausible that it was just one of many ways in which he valued his 
spleen. Moore may have, for example, felt that the commercial use of 
his body harmed his dignity; that is, the fact that someone had mined his 
body for valuable molecules may have felt disrespectful. Moore may 
have wanted to make a gift of his tissue by dedicating it to the public. 
This would have made him feel important and generous. Moore may 
even have felt that permitting the research might increase his chances of 
survival or lead to a cure for cancer, and he thus would have welcomed 
it. 
While Moore may have felt any or all of these ways about his body, 
the values these feelings represent-dignity, charity, sharing, life, and 
community among others-do not find voice within property discourse. 
This is because these values do not translate into the language of the 
market. Thus property rights are, and were in Moore, allocated without 
reference to them. As a result of tthe decision in Moore, Golde 
preserved his property rights in Moore's biological materials. Further, 
Golde's way of valuing these materials, in terms of their value on the 
market, prevailed. 
243. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. 
244. Further, it ignored the fact that, despite highly interventionist andreductionalist 
techniques in medical care, the practice of medicine, as opposed to better nutrition, better 
sanitation, and other public health measures, has contributed only slightly to the increase 
in the lifespanofindividuals in the United States. FREUND & MCGUIRE, supranote 142, 
at 20. 
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Given that values are incommensurable, the values put aside by the 
Moore court will not be weighed and considered through market forces. 
The market has no mechanism by which to compare the values of 
autonomy, dignity, and increased health, or to decide whether a holistic 
or a reductionalist approach to medicine is most beneficial. In fact, the 
very act of subjecting the cells to the market alters the ways in which 
they can be valued. The social meaning of Moore dedicating his cells 
to the community, for example, is different when those cells have a 
market value: Moore's gift becomes quantified. 
Of the identified non-market values implicated in the Moore case, the 
health care concerns in themselves demonstrate the difficulty of a 
property analysis based solely on market considerations. Such an 
analysis fails even if one accepts market discourse because market 
assumptions break down in the health care sector. The patient-physician 
relationship, for example, is unlike the arms-length commercial 
relationships upon which market norms are based. In this relationship, 
the patient not only "purchases" health care from the physician but 
entrusts the physician to select what ought to be purchased.245 Thus, 
the ideal of a rational, at least somewhat informed, agent is lost. 
Second, the cost of the selected health care is usually paid for by third 
party insurers or the public purse.246 The bargaining relationship 
between patient and physician, to the extent there is any, is limited more 
by an insurer's rules than by the direct monetary considerations of 
patient and physician. Third, the patient's health has strong effects on 
parties external to the patient-physician relationship, such as the patient's 
family, the patient's employer, and the patient's community.247 These 
effects, being external to the market, are invisible to it. In sum, there 
is rampant market failure in the provision of health care.248 
The deficiency of a market analysis of health care and human 
biological materials is most apparent in its attempt to quantify, in terms 
of a market price, health status and pain. These aspects of health are 
245. See generally EVANS, supra note 10, at 71-73, 75-76; Ginsberg, supra note 
191, at 6-7; Ethan A. Halm & Annetine C. Gelijns, An Introduction to the Changing 
Economics of Technological Innovation in Medicine, in THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 1, 3-4 (Annetine C. Gelijns & Ethan A.Halm eds., 1991). 
246. Halm & Gelijns, supra note 245, at 3-4. 
247. EVANS, supra note 10, at 54; Ginsberg, supra note 191, at 6-7. 
248. EVANS, supra note 10, at 93. 
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hard to define249 and notoriously difficult to quantify. For example, 
whether one measures a change in a person's health in terms of a 
fluctuation in that person's earning power,250 on the basis of that 
person's willingness to pay for an improvement in health,251 or in 
terms of a change in that person's lifespan,252 the technique chosen 
will be inadequate to the task. Valuing health in terms of earning power 
relegates the health of the elderly, the young, women, and racial 
'minorities to a level below that of middle-aged white men who are the 
highest income earners.253 The willingness-to-pay approach is not only 
sensitive to wealth but provides vastly different results depending on 
whether one measures individuals' willingness to pay before or during 
illness.254 Measuring health in terms of years of life fails to account 
for the enjoyment of that life.255 Two bedridden years in pain is 
hardly equal to two years feeling fit, yet a market analysis based on 
lifespan would treat these as equivalent. The proposed remedy to this 
latter difficulty is to measure quality-adjusted life years,256 but this 
solution simply brings us back to the question of how to measure the 
quality of a quality-adjusted life year. 
Lurking behind any method of measuring health status is the larger 
obstacle of measuring pain and suffering. Because we can never truly 
anticipate pain's nature and impact on us, because we cannot clearly 
express this impact, and because we cannot rationally deliberate under 
the influence of severe pain,257 any attempt to quantify the alleviation 
of pain in terms of price is impossible. Yet if pain cannot be measured 
nor the value of the alleviation of that pain be quantified, then neither 
can we appraise the value of improving a person's health status. The 
entire enterprise of measuring health on a scale of value is extremely 
precarious. Also hanging in this precarious position is the market price 
of human biological materials. After all, such materials derive their 
value directly from their ability to alleviate pain and increase health 
status. If the values of pain relief and health status cannot themselves 
249. For example, does good health include the absence of stress, and if so, what 
kinds of stress? Does a broken heart constitute pain? 
250. This form of valuation is called the human capital approach. See EVANS, supra 
note 10, at 252-55. 
251. The willingness-to-pay approach. Id at 255-57. 
252. Id at 263-64. 
253. Id at 252-55. 
254. Id at 255-57; H.P. Galler, The Willingness-To-Pay Approach: Caveats to 
Biased Application, in COSTS AND BENEFITS IN HEALTH AND PREVENTION: AN 
INIBRNATIONAL APPROACH TO PRIORITIES IN MEDICINE, supra note 191, at 35, 37-39. 
255. EVANS, supra note 10, at 263-64. 
256. Id 
257. See SCARRY, supra note 95. 
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be measured, then it is unrealistic to talk of a market price for human 
biological materials that in any way reflects the true values at stake. 
A market analysis of human biological materials, based on the 
assumption that all values inhering in such materials can be assigned a 
market price, cannot live up to its underlying assumption. Justice Mosk 
pointed to two values, dignity and equity, for which the market is unable 
to provide a price.258 Other values such as the equitable distribution 
of health care, safety, and the community interest in the health status of 
all its members are similarly left out of the market's calculations. 
Unless, as Justice Mosk attempted to do, the court explicitly deliberates 
upon such values, the resulting property decision will fail to appropriate-
ly reflect all of the values inhering in human biological materials. A 
market analysis, such as the majority undertook, without a concomitant 
evaluation of non-market values leads, as Justice Mosk argued, to a 
result that "is both inequitable and immoral."259 
Subjecting human biological materials to the market fails to accord 
with the frameworks in which we understand and value these materials. 
Nonetheless, society must find ways of making decisions about these 
materials. The alternative is a series of ad hoc determinations about 
their control that may be more harmful to the values we cherish than 
would be a market analysis. The lack of commensurability is not an 
excuse that justifies the failure to attempt to arrive at a reasoned choice 
concerning control of human biological materials. 
E. Making Comparisons Without Commensurability 
One way to make choices about human biological materials is to 
compare them. Simply because values are not commensurable does not 
imply that they are not comparable.260 By comparable, it is meant that 
in any given situation we can discuss the claims made upon us by the 
various values that we hold. Within the particular circumstances of a 
decision, our values place concrete demands upon us. These demands 
interact making some courses of action, or determinations of who we 
want to be, preferable to others. We can evaluate the force that each 
258. See supra note 207. 
259. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 175, 793 P.2d 479, 516, 
271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 183 (1990)(Mosk, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991). 
260. STOCKER, supra note 228, at 154. 
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value has on us, taking into account the interaction between values, our 
goals, our perception of ourselves, and the facts underlying the decision. 
There is no need to place values on a common scale to undertake such 
deliberation; rather, values amplify or modulate each other within the 
specific deliberative context. It is this interaction between values that 
any attempt at commensurability ignores. By ignoring such interaction, 
commensurability fails to respond to the very real demands put upon us 
when we deliberate. 
Consider again Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United 
States Steel Corp. 261 Recall that in that case, the parties were contest-
ing control over two steel mills in Youngstown. The community and 
U.S. Steel valued the mills in dramatically different ways. The 
community valued the mills in terms of autonomy, community, and 
reliance; U.S. Steel valued the mills as a means to make a profit. Recall 
further that the U.S. Steel court held that, as much as it respected the 
ways in which the community valued the mills, there was no basis in 
law on which the court could further those values. That is, the only 
values that the court could directly consider were market values. The 
court found that its decision had to ensure that the mills were tradeable 
on the market so that mills in general would be put to their highest use. 
Assume, however, that the U.S. Steel court had been convinced that 
the market was unable to ensure that the mills would be put to their 
highest use because the values inhering in the mills were incommensura-
ble. The court would then have had only two choices: to allocate 
property rights only after examining and comparing the incommensura-
ble values inhering in the mills, or to assign property rights based on 
market values alone but with the recognition that the law in a guise other 
than property would address the other non-market values inhering in the 
mills. The choice of doing nothing-that is, not deciding who had 
property rights in the mills-would have been unacceptable: the court 
would have had to determine whether U.S. Steel could tear down the 
mills or whether the employees of U.S. Steel and the Youngstown 
community could run them. 
If the U.S. Steel court had decided to undertake the admittedly arduous 
task of examining the various values inhering in the mills, it would have 
had to determine the basis upon which it was going to decide which 
values it would further and which values it would not. Further, because 
choices among values are contingent on the complete set of values held 
by the decision-maker and require balance and subtlety, the court could 
strive at best to base its determination on certain of the values inhering 
261. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980); see supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text. 
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in the mills that it believed were particularly important. But because of 
the contingencies and the impossibility of knowing what balance to 
strike in other, even similar, cases, the court could not hope to articulate 
rules that would be applicable without substantive review in the future. 
In recognition of this, the court could seek to clearly articulate which 
values it attempted to further, the reasons why it chose those values, and 
what other important values were at stake. If the court clearly set out 
these points, future courts, having knowledge of whether the goals set 
out in the decision were actually achieved, holding a different mix of 
values, and having an appreciation of the subtleties of the cases before 
them, could re-evaluate the balance struck in the original decision when 
making their own decisions. 
For example, imagine that the U.S. Steel court had held that, in its 
judgment, the value of community was strongly implicated in the mills. 
Shutting down the mills would lead to the loss of community for the 
thousands of residents of Youngstown. The court may have concluded 
that, given the great reliance that the people of Youngstown had 
developed over the years on the mills with the encouragement of U.S. 
Steel, the harm to community caused by shutting down the mills 
outweighed any theoretical loss to market values introduced through the 
allocation of property rights to members of the community. At the same 
time, the court would have had to discuss the nature of the loss to 
market values that it anticipated: that, for example, third parties would 
be less interested in purchasing the mills because of uncertainty of title 
and that others would be less interested in investing in the construction 
of mills because of the possibility that they would lose control over 
them. Armed with such a decision, future courts could determine 
whether the U.S. Steel court was justified in its anticipation of the 
positive effects of its decision on the value of community and on the 
negative effects of its decision on market values. Such a future court 
could then re-evaluate the decision reached in U.S. Steel. 
The second option available to the U.S. Steel court would be to 
supplement its property discourse with other ways, within the law, of 
discussing the non-economic values inhering in the steel mills. Just as 
the majority in Moore supplemented its property law analysis with a 
discussion of the law of informed consent, it may have been possible for 
the U.S. Steel court to deal with the economic consequences associated 
with the closure of the mills within property discourse and deal with 
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community values or autonomy through the law of charities or through 
labor legislation. 
The defects of the language of the market cannot, however, be 
remedied through other discourses in other branches of the law. 
Property law has historically been and continues to be such a central 
feature of our legal system, and the financial incentives established 
through this branch of the law are so strong, that it is unlikely that other 
discourses can fill in what is left out in property discourse. The right to 
property is, after all, not only venerated in the common law and civil 
law, it is enshrined in the United States Constitution.262 Its influence 
within the law remains strong despite the passing years and changes in 
legal theory. 
Legal as well as political rhetoric implied that property rights gave effect to 
some preexisting natural phenomenon-whose concreteness gave an intuitive 
certainty and substance to the legal construct. Lawyers' and judges' daily work 
with the mutability, variety and multiplicity of property rights seemed (for at 
least 150 years) not to have shaken their sense that property rights were 
different from other legal entitlements and deserved a special and protected 
status.263 
The difficulty with property discourse is that it preempts other 
discourses. The conception of property as having absolute dominion, 
although supplanted, continues to inform our understanding of how 
property rights interact with other rights. A person holding a proprietary 
interest in a good is entitled to do anything with respect to that interest 
unless doing so is specifically prohibited.264 On the other hand, a 
person with a non-proprietary interest in the good is not entitled to do 
anything with that good unless specifically entitled. 
Property rights are both positive, in that the holder of such rights is 
entitled to use and possess the good that is the subject matter of the 
rights as she or he chooses, and negative, in that the holder of such 
rights is entitled to prevent others from making use of the good.265 
262. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
263. Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private 
Property, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241, 252 n.19 (Jon Elster & Rune 
Slagstad eds., 1988). 
264. Honore stated: 
The protection of the right to possess, and so of one essential element in 
ownership, is achieved only when there are rules allotting exclusive physical 
control to one person rather than another, and that not merely on the basis that 
the person who has such control at the moment is entitled to continue in 
control. 
Honore, supra note 18, at 114. 
265. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT To PRIVATE PROPERTY 39 (1988). Waldron 
states that "[t]he owner of a resource is simply the individual whose determination as to 
the use of the resource is taken as final in a system [of private property]." Id. 
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Someone having a non-proprietary interest in the goods generally has 
only the negative right to prevent another, the owner, from using the 
good in a manner detrimental to the non-property claimant's interest. 
Thus, an owner of a factory can use the factory to manufacture goods, 
can demolish the factory, and can prevent others from entering into the 
factory. A neighbor of the factory has only the right to prevent certain 
uses of the factory, such as using the factory in a way that pollutes. 
The right to prevent certain activity is not always sufficient, however, 
for those valuing a contested good in terms of its non-market values. 
Consider, once again, the decision of the majority in Moore. While the 
ability to prevent certain research can arguably be vindicated through 
means other than property rights (in that case, the law of informed 
consent), the right to direct research, to share in the benefits, and to 
publish results of research conducted on human biological materials 
cannot be vindicated without the rights of possession and of use. These 
rights are attributes of property. Thus, because the majority in Moore 
could not discuss the non-market values inhering in the body at the time 
its property decision was being made, it failed to fully vindicate such 
values. 
Given that the option of supplementing property discourse with other 
discourses is not likely to lead to an appropriate consideration of all 
values inhering in a good, the capacity of property discourse to include 
an explicit consideration of non-market values lies at the heart of our 
choice concerning the appropriate method of assessing claims concerning 
human biological materials. If property discourse is open to change and 
this change can be brought about before property rights are fixed in 
human biological materials, then property law would be an appropriate 
vehicle through which to balance the many values inhering in such 
materials. If property law is either not open to such change or is open 
to change only over the long term, then we ought not to discuss human 
biological materials within property discourse. 
V. ls PROPERTY DISCOURSE FLEXIBLE? 
As set out in the discussion of a hypothetical U.S. Steel decision, the 
first option for dealing with contemporary property discourse's focus on 
market values is to open up the discourse to other competing, non-
market values. This would lead a court away from simply allocating 
property rights on the basis of factors such as whether a good can be 
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traded on the market, whether certainty of title provides an economic 
motivation to create more of that good, and whether the grant of rights 
tends to hinder further development, and toward an allocation of 
property rights on the basis of a combination of these market factors and 
such non-market factors as human dignity, human health, environmental 
safety, and self-development. 
Legal theorists have proposed a number of differing ways in which to 
expand property discourse. Margaret Jane Radin, for example, suggests 
that property rights ought to be created in order to promote self-
development 266 According to her theory, drawn from Hegel, individu-
als need to control portions of their environment so as to develop into 
free, responsible persons.267 An individual grows by investing his or 
her will in objects existing in the external world.268 Radin argues that 
property entitlements should be granted to individuals to encourage this 
process.269 According to her view, goods are important in various 
ways to one's self-development. Strong property entitlements should be 
created for those goods with which we are most closely bound, such as 
heirlooms, wedding rings, and homes.270 Weaker entitlements ought 
to be allocated to goods that we value only instrumentally, such as 
money and objects we mass-produce. 271 This understanding of 
property encourages individuals to value goods intrinsically as embodi-
ments of themselves and instrumentally as means to self-development. 
William Simon argues that property ought to promote democracy and 
community involvement.272 He suggests that property entitlements 
ought to be created in such a fashion that individuals are encouraged to 
view their property interests as stakes in the community rather than as 
a means for individual profit. This can be accomplished, according to 
Simon, by permitting individuals to alienate their property only to other 
members of the community and by placing limits on the quantity of 
goods that any one individual can hold.273 These constraints, Simon 
posits, provide individuals with material security and protection against 
subordination to either wealthy individuals or an impersonal market and 
266. Radin, supra note 24, at 957, 972-73; see also WALDRON, supra note 265 
(putting forth a similar self-development rationale for property). 
267. Radin, supra note 24, at 957. 
268. Id. at 972-73. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 987. 
271. Id. 
272. William H. Simon, Social-RepublicanProperty,38 UCLAL. REV. 1335, 1340-
41 (1991). 
273. Id. at 1341. 
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promote political responsibility.274 This understanding of property, 
therefore, promotes valuing goods as one's investment in the community 
and as providing one with a sense of place and commitment. 
Laura Underkufller 's theory of property, which she calls the compre-
hensive approach, aims at promoting individual self-mastery.275 On 
this view, property rights mediate between the interests of the individual 
and those of the collective without preferring either absolutely.276 
Underkufller argues that property rights ought to be created in goods 
beyond physical objects and their analogs. She suggests that human 
rights, such as freedom of conscience, free use of facilities, and free 
choice of employment ought to be subject to property rights.277 
According to Underkufller, increasing the scope of property rights leads 
away from the conception of property as an absolute right, to a 
conception of property as a right contingent on the community inter-
est. 278 The comprehensive approach attempts, therefore, to promote 
self-mastery within while maintaining collective interests as well.279 
Like Radin 's theory, this understanding of property encourages 
individuals to value goods as means to self-development. In addition, 
like social-republican property, the comprehensive approach promotes 
valuing goods as providing one with a place in the community. 
Richard Posner offers a significantly different rationale for property 
entitlements.280 He suggests that property rights ought to be created 
and allocated so as to maximize wealth.281 Accordingly, Posner 
submits that an absolute property right to a good ought to be created 
where transaction costs in that good are low.282 Where such costs are 
high, on the other hand, no property right or conditional property right 
ought to be created. 283 Moreover, to ensure an economically efficient 
result, Posner argues that property rights in goods ought to be allocated 
274. Id at 1340. 
275. Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 138-39 
(1990). 
276. Id at 141-42. 
277. Id at 139. 
278. Id at 139-40, 142-44. 
279. Id at 139-40. 
280. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 69-72 (1981). 
281. Id at 69. 
282. Id at 70. 
283. Id 
1233 
to those individuals who value them the most.284 Unlike the other 
theories of property examined above, Posner's understanding of property 
encourages individuals to value goods only instrumentally, as the means 
to maximize their wealth. 
According to each of these theorists, property regimes ought to 
promote particular ways of valuing goods. For example, a wedding ring 
ought to be valued, on Radin's conception of property, as a symbol of 
love and a shared life; on Simon's view of property, as a stake in a 
long-term relationship; on Underkuffler 's understanding of property, as 
a symbol of a socially sanctioned relationship and; on Posner's 
conception of property, as wealth.285 Most of the above theorists 
recognize, however, that much of contemporary property discourse fails 
to value goods according to their favored dimension. Nevertheless, 
implicit in their writing is the hope that this situation can change and, 
further, that such change can occur within current property discourse. 
They believe that the current conception of property is sufficiently 
flexible to allow for the changes sought. 
A. Languages and Concepts 
The fact that many differing conceptions of property exist does not 
guarantee that we can reshape current property discourse, focused as it 
is on market values, into one that invites discussion of all kinds of 
values, market or otherwise. Property discourse may be so entrenched 
in the law and the rights that members of society expect, that any 
reconceptualization, if possible at all, could only occur over an extended 
period of time. On the other hand, given the advances in and promises 
of biotechnology, human biological materials will increasingly be the 
subject of disputes. Therefore, if the current conception of property is 
not changed in the very near future, we risk allocating rights to human 
biological materials on the basis of an unchanged property discourse that 
ignores significant non-market values. 
284. Id. at 71. 
285. In addition to the above theorists, others suggest different modes of valuing 
goods. For example, Singer argues that, through property, goods ought to be valued in 
terms of sharing. See Singer, supra note 69. Munzer suggests that property rights rest 
upon a plurality of reasons, including utilitarian considerations, Kantian or Rawlsian 
considerations of justice, and considerations of desert. Therefore, Munzer' s conception 
of property promotes a mixture of several modes of valuing goods. STEPHEN R. 
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (Jules Coleman ed., 1990). Still other theorists argue 
that property has become a meaningless concept. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The 
Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1980) [hereinafter NOMOS XXII]. 
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. 
In order to determine whether property discourse is open to change 
and, if so, the expected time frame for such a change, one needs to 
understand the nature of legal conceptions including how they are 
formed, how they shape legal doctrine, and how they are changed. 286 
We live in a world that is at once given-others like us exist, we 
drink, breathe, and become hungry; rocks, trees, and rivers exist-and 
that we have created-for example, literature, cars, aesthetics, and sports. 
We create the world in that we shape not only the form and availability 
of what is given, but we give such material meaning. We situate what 
is given in our system of beliefs. 287 Our ability to create goes one step 
further, however. By shaping what is given and by constructing 
meaning out of it, we shape who we are. In the words of Hannah 
Arendt, all things that enter into the human world "constantly condition 
their human makers."288 
For example, although the need for food is given to us as a condition 
of our existence, we create the meaning of hunger, taste, and sharing. 
These created "things" then condition us: we grow food so as not to go 
hungry. We develop skills in cooking food in response to our ability to 
distinguish taste, and we eat with others, creating rituals of sharing. Out 
of the interaction of these conditions with others grow additional 
conditions: the food market, education, and friends and family. 
Conditions amass atop conditions until we who live under them are 
unable to conceive of the world without sweet and sour, companionship, 
or skill. 
We shape, and are simultaneously shaped by, things both tangible, 
such as a chair or a book, and intangible, such as rest or study. Just as 
a chair determines the manner in which we eat, our understanding of 
friends and family determines with whom we eat. The result of this 
shaping is that we come to understand the world not in its given form 
but in the form in which we have reshaped it. We only understand 
things within the framework of understanding to which we have affixed 
them. Food is not simply bare sustenance; it is sweet or bitter, heavy or 
light, eaten alone, with family, or with friends. It is satisfying or 
286. See Richard Gold, A Structural Dynamic Theory of Law, 16 QUEEN'S L.J. 347 
(1991) for a more detailed discussion of the process of change within law. 
287. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 9 (1958). 
288. Id 
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lacking. It is prepared with care or indifference, and its consumption 
emphasizes contentment or loneliness. 
As we reshape the given world, we create needs and opportunities for 
ourselves. In reshaping food, we create the need for chefs and for 
developed palates on the one hand, and for famine relief and aid workers 
on the other. These roles shape our lives and contribute to the formation 
of our identities. 289 The chef develops an understanding of texture, 
color, sour, salt, presentation, atmosphere, freshness, and scent-an 
understanding beyond the experience of the rest of us. The aid worker 
comes to know of degrees of hunger, disease, hope and hopelessness, of 
stretching food as far as it can go, and of deciding who can benefit and 
who cannot. These understandings shape who we are and what we care 
about. 
We do not reshape the given world merely by material instruments. 
We create meaning and roles from it through language, art, and action. 
Just as a spider builds its web to catch its prey and the beaver builds its 
dam to create a home, we create our world through words, images, and 
deeds. 290 Language provides the bridge between the world in its given 
form and the world as we understand it within our frameworks. 
"[L]anguages capture and drive our minds,"291 simultaneously reshap-
ing the givenness of the world and creating and altering who we are. 
Through words, images, and deeds, we create ourselves: 
We ... are almost constantly engaged in presenting ourselves to others, and 
to ourselves, and hence representing ourselves-in language and gesture, 
external and internal . . . . Our human environment contains not just food and 
shelter, enemies to fight or flee, and conspecifics with whom to mate, but 
words, words, words. These words are potent elements of our environment that 
we readily incorporate, ingesting and extruding them, weaving them like 
spiderwebs into self-protective strings of narrative.292 
Languages are not neutral factors in our understanding of the world. 
They open up vistas of thought while closing others off. To have one 
word for "snow" is to conceive of one's natural environment in a very 
different way then if one had many, as do the Inuit.293 Similarly, to 
think of a family as a married man and woman with several children, as 
289. MICHAEL ALBERT ET AL., LIBERATING THEORY 20 (1986). 
290. DENNETT, supra note 98, at 416; ARENDT, supra note 287, at 179-80. 
291. JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND 
LEGAL CRITICISM 50 (1990). 
292. DENNETT, supra note 98, at 417. 
293. See Jane E. Brody, For Snow the Real Action Begins After It Falls, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1988, at Cl (referring to the fact that the Inuit have approximately four 
dozen words to describe snow and ice). But see STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE 
INSTINCT 64-65 (1994) (arguing that the Inuit do not, in fact, have any more words for 
snow than other North Americans). 
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the traditional Western family is usually depicted, is far different from 
conceiving of a family as one or more parents of the same or different 
sex with or without children. 294 Thus, languages incorporate our 
ideologies, or, ideology becomes reified in our language.295 
To illustrate the effect that language has on our thought, consider the 
label "illness." While it appears ostensibly neutral, once this label is 
attached to some set of characteristics, it transforms the way we 
understand those characteristics. As Irving K. Zola explains: 
By the very acceptance of a specific behaviour as an illness and the definition 
of illness as an undesirable state the issue becomes not whether to deal with a 
particular problem but how and when. Thus, the debate over homosexuality, 
drugs, abortion, hyperactive children, antisocial behaviour, becomes focused on 
the degree of sickness attached to the phenomenon in question ( and its carriers) 
or the extent of a 'health' risk which is involved. And the more principled, 
more perplexing, or even moral issue of what freedom should an individual 
have over his/her body, or what else, besides the individual, needs treating is 
shunted aside.296 
The confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas as a justice on the 
United States Supreme Court several years ago exemplified the power 
294. Certainly former Vice President Dan Quayle does not seem able to envision 
that a single woman with a child is a "family." See, e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle 
Says Riots Sprang From Lack of Family Values, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at Al, A20; 
Excerpts From Vice President's Speech on Cities and Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 
1992, at A20; Michael Wines, Views on Single Motherhood Are Multiple at White 
House, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at Al, Bl6. 
295. See Gold, supra note 286, at 348, for a discussion of how ideology becomes 
reified in the language of the law. See also GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS 
CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS 93, l 00 (Rodney Livingstone trans., 
1971 ). Although Lukacs does not specifically state that reification occurs partly through 
language, he posits that the manner in which we act, specifically by market exchange, 
fundamentally shapes our understanding of the world. 
296. Irving K. Zola, Healthism and Disabling Medicalization, in DISABLING 
PROFESSIONS 41, 64 (Ivan Illich et al. eds., 1977); see also Abby Lippman, Prenatal 
Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 15, 25 (1991). Lippman states: 
Id 
Prenatal diagnosis presupposes that certain fetal conditions are intrinsically not 
bearable. Increasing diagnostic capability means that such conditions, as well 
as a host of variations that can be detected in utero, are proliferating, 
necessarily broadening the range of what is not "bearable" and restricting 
concepts of what is "normal." It is, perhaps, not unreasonable to ask if the 
"imperfect" will become anything we can diagnose. 
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of the label "illness."297 At those hearings, Anita Hill testified that 
Thomas had sexually harassed her at work. Thomas supporters on the 
Judiciary Committee did not want to call Hill a liar but still wanted to 
undermine her testimony. To the extent they succeeded, they did so by 
attaching the label "ill" to Hill. By making unsupported and, presum-
ably, unsupportable psychological diagnoses of Hill, the Thomas 
supporters attempted to show that while Hill may have believed what she 
was saying, she only believed it because she was sick. Since Hill was 
presumed to be ill, what she had to say about her illness was taken as 
a symptom of the disease, not as rebuttal. 
B. The Language of the Market 
The label "property" is closely wedded to market values. Each 
implies the other-material that promotes market values is labelled 
property and material that is labelled property is seen to promote market 
values. The power of the language of property must not be underesti-
mated. As James Boyd White has pointed out, "when we speak our 
languages we cannot help believing them, we cannot help participating, 
emotionally and ethically and politically, in the worlds they create and 
in the structures of perception and feeling they offer us. In time the 
soldier wants to go to war."298 
The language of the market prematurely ends discussion about other 
ways of valuing goods.299 This language encourages the participant to 
understand and accept that the world functions according to "self-
interest": 
[E]conomics cannot, in principle, talk about any activity, any pleasure or motive 
or interest, other than the acquisitive or instrumental one that it universalizes. 
(Indeed it does not talk about this either but merely assumes and acts upon it.) 
297. See David B. Wilkins, Presumed Crazy: The Structure of Argument in the 
Hill/Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1517 (1992). 
298. WHITE, supra note 291, at 50. 
299. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1884-85 
(1987). Margaret Radin would go further than is required here and argue that discussing 
a good in terms of its economic value actually degrades our appreciation of that good: 
Market rhetoric, if adopted by everyone, and in many contexts, would indeed 
transform the texture of the human world. This rhetoric leads us to view 
politics as just rent seeking, reproductive capacity as just a scarce good for 
which there is high demand, and the repugnance of slavery as just a cost. To 
accept these views is to accept the conception of human flourishing they imply, 
one that is inferior to the conception we can accept as properly ours. An 
inferior conception of human flourishing disables us from conceptualizing the 
world rightly. Market rhetoric, the rhetoric of alienability of all "goods," is 
also the rhetoric of alienation of ourselves from what we can be as persons. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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This is not to be "value free," as its apologists claim, but to make aggressive 
self-interest the central, indeed the only, value, for it is the only one that can be 
talked about in these terms. To come at it the other way, it is to claim that all 
motives and interests can be talked about, at least for some purposes, as if they 
were selfish, quantifiable, and interchangeable; this is to erase all worlds of 
meaning except its own.300 
To speak the language of property is to accept the modes of evaluation 
implicit in that language. It is to speak as if the primary values to be 
promoted are those of the market. When we realize that other ways of 
valuing goods are at stake, as was the case in US. Steel, we do not have 
the language to speak them. To see the world in terms of market values 
is not to see the world in terms of relationships, personal development, 
or any other way of valuing goods. While it is often appropriate to 
value some goods in terms of market values, not all goods ought 
properly be valued in this way. To talk about the latter goods in the 
language of the market, and this is what we do when we attach the label 
"property," is to miss much of what is important about them.301 
C. The Evolution of the Property Concept 
Labels and language are difficult and slow to change. The law 
represents a complex organization of concepts and principles.302 
Adjusting one impacts on the rest; often the influence of the rest 
undermines the adjustment. Because of the complexity of the legal 
system, usually only small changes can be made at a time. It takes 
many such small changes to change a principle, and more time and 
changes to many principles to change a significant branch of the law. 
Just as the abolition of slavery did not immediately result in the equality 
of blacks and whites, a change to one area of law takes many years to 
affect another. 
The concept of property as based on market values evolved into its 
present form over the course of the past two hundred years. 303 Morton 
300. WHITE, supra note 291, at 57-58. 
301. Radin, supra note 299, at 1877-84. 
302. See Gold, supra note 286, at 366-68, 371-73. 
303. See Vandevelde, supra note 18 ( discussing the development of property from 
being absolute dominion over things to being a relationship between people); Charles 
Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicatedjrom its Past, in NOMOS 
XXII, supra note 285, at 28 (examining property from its roots in Roman law to the 
twentieth century); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
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Horwitz describes the transformation as one from absolute dominion to 
the promotion of use and development: 
As the spirit of economic development began to take hold of American society 
in the early years of the nineteenth century, however, the idea of property 
underwent a fundamental transformation-from a static agrarian conception 
entitling an owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a dynamic, instrumental, and 
more abstract view of property that emphasized the newly paramount virtues of 
productive use and development.304 
The speed of change in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
measured over decades and taking over one hundred years to accom-
plish, illustrates that a fundamental shift in conception is possible, but 
only over a long period of time. The legal theorists' goal of transform-
ing property law to incorporate values of self-development, community, 
and political responsibility is not one, therefore, that will easily or soon 
be achieved. The weight of history and of rhetoric is against a quick 
change. Further, as Jennifer Nedelsky notes, there is no sure victory at 
the end: 
The very strength of the tradition of property makes it in some ways a 
precarious base for innovation. When one chooses to use property, redefined, 
to provide new kinds of constitutional protection for rights of autonomy, 
participation, or material well-being, one runs the risk that temporary advances 
will fall back before a long and much narrower tradition.30' 
Since market values are at the center of property law discourse, we 
risk viewing all goods called "property" in a very limited fashion. 
While this may not be particularly troublesome when applied to many 
goods-those that our society has traditionally and appropriately valued 
primarily as market goods such as stocks, paper-clips, and pens-it 
raises serious concern when applied to such goods as the human body. 
Viewing the body while wearing the blinders of the language of the 
market may result in legal decisions that fail to adequately account for 
the non-market values inhering in the body. For example, the under-
standing generated by valuing the body as a resource to be mined and 
1780-1860 (1977) (discussing the development of the conception of property from the 
late eighteenth century to the late nineteenth century). Although Horwitz's book has 
been criticized on several fronts, his basic thesis that the conception of property within 
the law changed in the nineteenth century seems to have been generally accepted. See, 
e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories,36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 96-98 (1984); 
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 319 (1990). But 
see Alan Watson, The Transformation of American Property Law: A Comparative Law 
Approach, 24 GA. L. REV. 163, 186-216 (1990). 
304. HORWITZ, supra note 303, at 31. 
305. NEDELSKY, supra note 303, at 243. 
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as an opportunity for profit may very well lead to the development of 
defective health care policies.306 
D. Present Conceptions; Future Hopes 
It is not being argued that change is impossible or undesirable. 
However, while the introduction of a new way of valuing goods within 
property discourse will make this discourse a more flexible tool in 
protecting important social interests, one cannot expect that this 
introduction will occur for some time. One should, therefore, be 
cautious in formulating strategies to achieve reform. One should be 
especially careful about attempts to protect goods that previously were 
not considered property through property law. Although such goods 
presently do not get the protection offered by property rights, we risk 
allocating them in a way that undermines important non-market values 
inhering in them. 
Instead of attempting to protect new goods through property law, this 
Article suggests the better strategy is to first attempt to change the way 
we talk about those goods already subject to property rights. One could, 
as Radin suggests, evaluate the respective property interests of landlords 
and tenants in terms of personal development. 307 Alternatively, one 
could argue that the owner of a culturally significant work of art must 
make the work available to the public. Only when property law has 
expanded to truly permit a full and open discussion of non-market ways 
of valuing goods should reformers and theorists seek to subject new 
goods-such as the human body or health-to property analysis. 
For example, the author does not agree with Radin's view that women 
should have a property right in their reproductive abilities for purposes 
of surrogacy, even if restrictions are placed on that property right so that 
a woman cannot "rent" her womb on the market. 308 Given that market 
values are reified in contemporary property law discourse, thinking of 
women's reproductive abilities in the language of property presents the 
306. For example, the lure of profits to be made by the discovery of new 
pharmaceutical products may entice researchers to forgo research centered on comm unity 
or environmental causes of disease and lead them toward research aimed at discovering 
cures to these diseases. The balance between pure and applied research may be 
inappropriately skewed. 
307. Radin, supra note 24, at 993-94. 
308. Radin, supra note 299, at 1932-34. 
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very real possibility that we will blind ourselves to other ways of valuing 
women's bodies, women themselves, and children. For example, we 
may fail to adequately consider the effects on the social development of 
a child born through surrogacy. 
Considering a woman's reproductive capacities as a property right 
with restrictions on alienation, as Radin suggests, 309 presents an 
additional danger. Placing such restrictions runs counter to market 
values. The power to alienate property rights is a central tenet of 
property law.310 Given the importance of market values within 
property discourse, any restriction on the power to alienate will be 
treated with some hostility. Over time, the pressure to allow the 
alienation of surrogacy services may win the day. A woman's reproduc-
tive capacities would then become a commodity and be valued as 
such.311 
E. Human Biological Materials As Non-Proprietary Goods 
Given the likelihood that property discourse will not soon evolve to 
encourage discussion of non-market values, and given that property 
discourse preempts other discourses that do not focus on market values, 
it is advisable not to discuss human biological materials, in which many 
non-market values inhere, in terms of property. Property discourse is an 
inappropriate forum for the discussion of how the law ought to regulate 
the new biotechnologies and reproductive technologies as applied to the 
human body. 
In Moore, while both Justice Mosk and Justice Arabian wished to 
safeguard certain non-market values inhering in the human body, only 
Justice Arabian's suggestion that the body not be discussed within 
309. Id. 
310. See, e.g., Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 45 n.67 ( 1913); Honore, supra note 18, 
at 113; C.B. MacPherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, in THE RISE AND FALL OF 
ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 76, 81 (1985). 
311. This path from an inalienable property right to a fully alienable right is one 
that has already been travelled. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of 
Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 LA. L. REV. 443, .443 (1991). The right of 
publicity, which is now fully alienable and descendible, is one example of such a 
journey: 
Only two decades ago a celebrity had no cause of action against an advertiser 
who imitated her voice. Until the 1970's any commercial value associated 
with celebrity was personal to the star and entered the public domain at death. 
As recently as the early 1950's celebrities could not assign the right to use 
their name and likeness. At the beginning of this century the law denied relief 
even to the living person whose name or likeness was the object of illicit 
appropriation. 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
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property discourse offers any possibility that this wish can be fulfilled. 
While Radin, Simon, Underkuffler, and .Justice Mosk are likely correct 
that property law could have developed in such a fashion as to value 
goods, including the human body, in terms of self-development, 
community, self-mastery, or dignity, property law did not develop in this 
way.312 
Justice Arabian's conclusion that market norms inherent in property 
discourse are incompatible with an open discussion and evaluation of 
non-market values carries with it a somber warning of the consequences 
of accepting that human biological materials are property. 313 While 
property discourse falls into the difficulties described above, those 
engaged in the discourse remain unaware of these difficulties because of 
their assumption that the market encompasses and quantifies all values. 
Therefore, without ever having consciously considered what is best for 
society, courts will establish a set of property rights and duties pertaining 
to human biological materials that promote certain values, but not others. 
Moreover, which values are promoted and which are not will be a 
function of chance. For example, granting researchers property rights 
in human biological materials and in the products of biotechnological 
312. One can share Margaret J. Radin's hope that property discourse can change 
over time to include such other modes of evaluation without agreeing that it is 
appropriate now to subject the human body to this discourse. See Margaret J. Radin, The 
Consequences of Conceptualism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 239, 243 (1986). Contra 
NEDELSKY, supra note 303, at 253. 
313. Justice Arabian's conclusion is similar to that reached by Richard Titmuss who 
has argued that a market in blood is incompatible with some community values such as 
altruism and social responsibility. TITMUSS, supra note 112, at 279. Titmuss asserted 
that a market in goods such as human blood drives out the feeling that one is responsible 
for one's neighbor: 
By contrast, one of the functions of atomistic private market systems is to 
"free" men [and women] from any sense of obligation to or for other men [and 
women] regardless of the consequences to others who cannot reciprocate, and 
to release some men [and women] (who are eligible to give) from a sense of 
inclusion in society at the cost of excluding other men [and women] (who are 
not eligible to give). 
Id at 239. When one sees the poor lining up to sell blood, Titmuss argued, one feels 
released from the obligation to give blood for the benefit of others. When blood is 
bought and sold, we come to look on it as any other commodity. Id at 171. No longer 
is a blood donation an expression of trust that strangers will come to our aid, as we have 
come to theirs when the need arises; rather, we come to trust the market to provide us 
with blood. Id at 238-39. Contra Eric Mack, Dominos and the Fear o/Commodification, 
in NOMOS XXXI: MARKETS AND JUSTICE 198, 217 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland 
Pennock eds., 1989). 
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research will likely skew research goals toward finding cures for disease 
and away from discovering the underlying social and environmental 
causes of disease. Because researchers and pharmaceutical companies 
profit from selling pharmaceutical products, they have no incentive to 
research how the lack of education, the lack of income, poor sanitation, 
and unsatisfactory working conditions cause disease since such research 
is unlikely to result in profitable products.314 In allocating property 
rights in human biological materials to researchers and pharmaceutical 
companies, the court would in effect be choosing a health policy that 
holds that health status is improved by access to better and newer 
treatments. Such a policy, however, is largely ineffective in improving 
health status.315 In this hypothetical situation, the court would not 
arrive at this policy through deliberation on how best to improve the 
community's health status; rather, the court would arrive at this policy 
by its assumption that the market ensures that health status is maximized 
among the citizenry.316 Another example of an unconsidered policy 
choice produced through the allocation of property rights in human 
biological materials is that disease ought to be viewed as an individual 
problem, specifically a problem of an individual's genetic code, instead 
314. See generally John Ratcliffe et al., Perspectives on Prevention: Health 
Promotion vs. Health Protection, in THE END OF AN ILLUSION: THE FUTURE OF 
HEALTH POLICY IN WESTERN INDUSTRJALIZED NATIONS 56, 66 (Jean de Kervasdoue et 
al. eds., 1984) (discussing the difference between a health policy that views health as 
subject to individual control and a health policy that views health as caused by societal 
factors). 
315. Id. at 66, 68-69. It is generally accepted among health policy analysts that 
health status and life expectancy are best promoted by social factors such as good 
sanitation, nutrition, housing, and education. Id.; see also EVANS, supra note 10, at 3; 
R.C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY 44-45 (1991) (contending that the decrease in 
mortality due to measles and tuberculosis over the past century has been due more to 
better nutrition than any advance in medical care); RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, 
EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH 60 (1993) (arguing that the recent resurgence in infections 
of tuberculosis, measles, syphilis, and gonorrhea has been due to social factors such as 
overcrowding and the lack of access to already-known vaccines); Karen Wright, Going 
by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 58 (indicating that 
cancer deaths have increased in recent decades and that these could have been prevented 
by limiting exposure to chemicals, by exercise, and by diet, and arguing that more 
money ought to be spent on cancer prevention rather than treatment). 
316. Robert G. Evans pointed to the paradox that relying on each individual health 
consumer to maximize his or her well-being produces an expensive and ineffective health 
care system: 
Suppose a group of people, a society, make their allocations between 
(efficacious) prevention and cure on the basis of individual marginal rates of 
substitution. By spending less on prevention, and more on cure, they may as 
a group have both shorter life expectancies and higher expenditure on life-
prolonging care. (Any parallel with United States health care is accidental, 
though the micro-rationality argument does come from the United States.) 
Ev ANS, supra note 10, at 256. 
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of as a societal problem.317 While this policy has been severely 
criticized,318 the courts nevertheless encourage it by granting research-
ers and pharmaceutical companies property rights in human DNA and 
human proteins. Since such researchers and companies only profit if 
they can claim that their piece of DNA or their protein is the cause of 
disease, instead of the environment, poor sanitation, or lack of adequate 
nutrition, they will conduct their research according to a model that 
understands disease to be located in an individual's genetic make-up.319 
The disagreement between Justices Mask and Arabian in Moore 
turned, at bottom, on Justice Arabian's rejection of the court's ability to 
expand property discourse beyond market concerns. Justice Arabian 
believed that because human biological materials are so valuable in non-
market ways, the court should not subject them to an analysis that would 
treat them as commodities.320 The values inhering in human biological 
materials, including the values inhering in good health, would be 
jeopardized in a discourse in which non-market values are assumed to 
be magically considered but are, in reality, ignored. Property discourse 
forecloses discussion of such policy concerns as the promotion of health 
317. Abby Lippman has called this policy the "geneticization" of health care: 
Geneticization refers to an ongoing process by which differences between 
individuals are reduced to their DNA codes, with most disorders, behaviors and 
physiological variations defined, at least in part, as genetic in origin. It refers 
as well to the process by which interventions employing genetic technologies 
are adopted to manage problems of health. Through this process, human 
biology is incorrectly equated with human genetics, implying that the latter 
acts alone to make us each the organism she or he is. 
Lippman, supra note 296, at 19; see also HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 315, at 5, 69. 
Some recent developments support the claim that health care is becoming geneticized. 
See, e.g., Rachel Nowak, Genetic Testing Set for Takeoff, 265 SCI. 464 (1994) 
( discussing fee-for-service genetic testing); Henry Hess, How the Mating Game Evolved, 
GLOBE & MAIL, July 6, 1994, at A12 (suggesting that unfaithfulness in sexual 
relationships is genetically programmed in humans); David Ankney, What If Violent 
Types Are Born, Not Made?, GLOBE & MAIL, July 6, 1994, at A20 (drawing links 
between genes and violent behavior); Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., Genes, Environment, and 
Personality, 264 SCI. 1700 (1994) (discussing the link between genetics and human 
personality); Genetic Signposts on the Road to Cancer, GLOBE & MAIL, June 11, 1994, 
at D8 ( discussing genetic markers for cancer); Gene Linked for First Time to High Blood 
Pressure Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al4 (discussing link between human gene 
and a form of hypertension); Gina Kolata, Genetic Defects Detected in Embryos Just 
Days Old, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1992, at Al (stating that genetic testing can be 
conducted in embryos that are just a few days old). 
318. Lippman, supra note 296; ILLICH, supra note 142; Zola, supra note 296. 
319. See Lippman, supra note 296, at 17. 
320. See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text. 
1245 
status, the direction of future biotechnological research, and the nature 
of community through its false assumption that such policies will be 
appropriately and neutrally formulated through the market. 
VI. CONCLUSION: NEW DIRECTIONS 
In U.S. Steel, the court had no option but to recognize some property 
right in the steel mills in Youngstown, Ohio. After all, the mills had 
been treated as property by the courts, the legislature, and those running 
them for a long time. The human body and human health have not, on 
the other hand, traditionally been considered property. The option of 
concluding that these goods should not be subjected to property 
discourse is, therefore, a real one. We can, as a society, conclude that 
the body and health are not and ought not be property. If the body and 
health are not property, they will not be evaluated within a discourse that 
focuses on their market aspects rather than the non-market values 
inhering in them. 
Rejecting property law analysis for the human body does not end the 
inquiry into how the law ought to respond to the very real and practical 
needs of the biotechnology industry. The status quo, in which research-
ers and pharmaceutical companies are likely to be able to apply for and 
receive patent rights in human tissues while the sources of such tissues 
are left without compensation, is not acceptable. In such a situation, the 
human body continues to be discussed in market terms assuming that 
human genes and cells are still patentable. Patients will continue to feel 
exploited as their bodies are treated as natural resources by others while 
they are not permitted to participate in such exploitation. 
If the case of Moore were reconsidered outside of property discourse, 
the various values involved could be compared and balanced against one 
another. We would have to explicitly discuss the approach, 
reductionalist or holistic, that we are taking to health care. We would 
need to talk about the role of the patient in the health care process. We 
would have to address the issue of how tied individuals' identities are to 
their bodies or body components. We would have to tum our minds to 
the meaning of sharing in the context of life and health. If we make our 
assumptions and approaches explicit in our judgment, instead of hiding 
them behind the facade of market forces, a later decision-maker could 
test them against reality and against the frameworks that exist at that 
time. We would not so much aim at getting the decision right-given 
the many values we could hold in our frameworks and their 
incommensurability, there is no right answer-but at making it understandable. 
We could decide, for example, that neither Moore nor Golde owns the 
cell-line but that they belong to some non-profit non-governmental 
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organization, such as the Red Cross. That organization would be 
entitled to license the use of the cell-line as it saw fit. We could provide 
representation of different segments of society on an ethics board to 
make these determinations. The board could, in addition, be given a 
mandate to pursue both research aimed at therapeutic uses of the cell-
line and research aimed at discovering the interaction between individu-
als and the environment on the incidence of disease. We could also give 
Moore some choice by allowing him to choose the organization that will 
control the cells. We could encourage Golde to conduct his research by 
ensuring that he would be granted a license to use the cell-line in his 
research. 
No one formula for dealing with human biological materials is likely 
to emerge from this suggested approach. This is as it should be since 
the values inhering in these materials take on different forms at different 
times depending on the type of material being discussed. 
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